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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FOUR ESSAYS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK-MITIGATION 
by  
Chiradip Chatterjee  
Florida International University, 2013  
Miami, Florida  
Professor Pallab Mozumder, Major Professor  
 Expected damages of environmental risks depend both on their intensities and 
probabilities. There is very little control over probabilities of climate related disasters 
such as hurricanes. Therefore, researchers of social science are interested identifying 
preparation and mitigation measures that build human resilience to disasters and avoid 
serious loss. Conversely, environmental degradation, which is a process through which 
the natural environment is compromised in some way, has been accelerated by human 
activities. As scientists are finding effective ways on how to prevent and reduce 
pollution, the society often fails to adopt these effective preventive methods. Researchers 
of psychological and contextual characterization offer specific lessons for policy 
interventions that encourage human efforts to reduce pollution. This dissertation 
addresses four discussions of effective policy regimes encouraging pro-environmental 
preference in consumption and production, and promoting risk mitigation behavior in the 
face of natural hazards.  
The first essay describes how the speed of adoption of environment friendly 
technologies is driven largely by consumers’ preferences and their learning dynamics 
rather than producers’ choice. 
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The second essay is an empirical analysis of a choice experiment to understand 
preferences for energy efficient investments. The empirical analysis suggests that 
subjects tend to increase energy efficient investment when they pay a pollution tax 
proportional to the total expenditure on energy consumption. However, investments in 
energy efficiency seem to be crowded out when subjects have the option to buy health 
insurance to cover pollution related health risks. 
In context of hurricane risk mitigation and in evidence of recently adopted My 
Safe Florida Home (MSFH) program by the State of Florida, the third essay shows that 
households with home insurance, prior experience with damages, and with a higher sense 
of vulnerability to be affected by hurricanes are more likely to allow home inspection to 
seek mitigation information. 
The fourth essay evaluates the impact of utility disruption on household wellbeing 
based on the responses of a household-level phone survey in the wake of hurricane 
Wilma. Findings highlight the need for significant investment to enhance the capacity of 
rapid utility restoration after a hurricane event in the context of South Florida. 
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CHAPTER I:  
ADOPTION OF GREEN TECHNOLOGY: THE DIFFUSION AND LEARNING 
PROCESS OF THE CONSUMERS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Eco-friendly or green technologies are instrumental in reducing damages to the 
environment. Yet a significant amount of literature indicates that adoption of eco-friendly 
technologies can be very slow in absence of economic incentives (Mahajan et al. 1990; 
Baker 2001; Hartmann 2006). The rationales are twofold. Firstly, firms may not realize 
the entire social benefit of green technologies (Porter and Kramer 2006; Bessen and 
Maskin 2009) or may find adoption of environment friendly technologies is not cost-
effective (York and Venkataraman 2010; Gang and Abetti 2010). Secondly, path 
dependence and long equipment replacement cycles of firms can slow down the adoption 
of eco-friendly technologies in production (Bollinger 2010; Omer 2009).  
Adoption of eco-friendly technologies often reduces environmental footprint of 
products, but may not necessarily change their consumption experience. Energy, for 
example, can be produced from renewable (e.g., wind mills) and non-renewable (e.g., 
coal fired power plants) sources. The non-renewable sources of energy, such as coal, are 
limited and can be exhausted. The renewable sources of energy, such as the sun, wind, 
geothermal, ocean energy, are available in abundant quantity. Non-renewable sources 
release emissions in the air when burnt and contribute to global warming, which may 
cause major environmental and health hazards. While there is not much changes in the 
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consumption experience of energy based on source, renewable and non-renewable energy 
are substantially different in terms of their environmental impacts.  
As energy-generating facilities decide their production process, they may continue 
using non-renewable (which is cheap and easy to use) sources or set up a renewable 
energy plant that has quite steep initial costs. Market price of renewable energy is 
comparatively higher than price of non-renewable energy due to the high initial set-up 
cost of renewable energy plants. Therefore, is it profitable replacing non-renewable 
electrical sources with renewable sources for an incumbent electrical facility? 
Consumer’s preference can answer this question.   
Firms believe that improvisation needs to be adopted, if appropriate to consumers’ 
experience (Jacob et al. 2009). If dissatisfied, people substitute their consumption instead 
of spending time to submit a complaint or compromise their preference (Hippel 1986; 
Jaeger et al. 2003; Nagamachi 1995). Buyers’ discretion is very important in success of 
new technologies, such as renewable sources of energy. For example, the analysts say 
that Germans are willing to pay for renewable energy out of their concern for the 
environment and climate change (Bonono et al. 2008). And the rapid switch to renewable 
energy sources has increased annual electricity bill of German households’ by nearly 
47%.  The significant market demand in Germany for renewable energy, from the 
environmental and climate change concern, substitutes non-renewable energy sources 
with renewable energy sources irrespective of a high switching cost. However, the 
potential of markets for “green” electricity may be limited and other support schemes 
may be required as there is insufficient market demand (Ek 2005).   
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With a preference for environmental safety, consumers judge the quality of their 
consumption choices along their environmental attributes (Chen 2001; Valentini 2009). 
While producers bring their environmental attributes in production and in advertising 
(Laroche 2001; Jaffe et al. 2002; Kirchhoff 2000), consumers are unable to readily 
observe these characteristics. Consumers are also characterized by myopia, habit 
formation and path dependency (van den Bergh 2010). Adoption of underlying eco-
friendly technologies becomes easier, as consumers learn about the environmental benefit 
claimed by producers.  
Let us suppose that a firm can produce X with either of technology x and 
technology y. While x is the incumbent technology, adoption of y does not improve 
consumption experience of X. However, y is environmentally benign production 
technique and X is characterized as G with additional environmental benefit with this 
underlying method of production. X and G have same consumption purpose and 
experience, but different in environmental impact. Adoption policies of y fall in four 
classes: a) increase in environmental awareness, b) help understand qualitative value of 
the green technologies, c) financial incentives to producers on adoption of eco-friendly 
technologies and d) set environmental regulations.  
Environmental preferences increase with awareness (Coad et al. 2009; Gilg et al. 
2005; Mostafa et al. 2007). Literature suggests that publishing “green consumer guides” 
that adds to environmental awareness can reduce environmental cost of consumption 
(Chen 2001). Salient environmental benefit of credence goods is difficult to judge and 
may hold the buyers back in deciding pro-environmental consumption.  A third-party 
intervention is often advised certifying environmental quality of products. Such 
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certifications not only reinforce consumers’ value (Cason and Gangadharan 2002; 
Amacher 2004; Swallow and Sedjo 2000; Dosi and Moretto 2001), but also restrain 
producers from frequently using cheap-talks claiming their products to be environment 
friendly. Demonstration also helps consumers understand environmental attribute of 
products through diffusion of information (Bollinger 2010), as people make consumption 
choices and expect equivalent utility (Bala and Goyal 1998; Bala and Goyal 2001). As 
other options become less effective, environmental regulations, financial incentives, or 
penalties, are most upfront strategies used in promotion of eco-friendly technologies 
(Stechow et al. 2011; Kelly and Kolstad 1999).  
Adoption policies are often interdependent. For example, Cantono and Silverberg 
(2009) have developed a network model of consumers that describes a reservation price 
for eco-friendly commodities, which increases with number of buyers. The reservation 
price is the highest price a buyer agrees to pay. They explain a subsidy policy that 
initiates a self-sustained process of consumption diffusion, through an initial pool of 
consumers. Tarui and Polasky (2005) compared rules of discretion in adoption of green 
technologies and concluded that rules are superior to discretion because discretionary 
policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future 
regulation when there is little uncertainty.  
However, there is no common framework that pulls all different policies together. 
Here I have explained adoption of green technology with consumers’ discretion. The 
framework also describes a process where economic agents, instead of the social planner, 
make decisions (Kelly and Kolstad 1999). According to Kelly and Kolstad, as people 
make choices to adopt green technologies, it solves the issue of asymmetric information 
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between consumers and producers. Learning also depends on arrival of information, as 
agents have some control over the arrival rate of information in active learning.   
The rest of the chapter follows the following layout. Section 2 analyzes the choice 
of technology switch with consumers’ discretion. Section 3 explains the criterion of 
switching technology. Section 4 examines the distribution of Markov time, required time 
to adopt green technology. Section 5 discusses how policy can reduce the required time 
to adopt environment friendly technology.  Section 6 concludes with implications of our 
findings and makes suggestions for future research. 
2. ADOPTION MODEL 
Consumption 
Let us suppose that X is an infinitely divisible commodity and its environmental 
quality is q. As X is the incumbent commodity, the buyers know the quality q. Here I 
assume that individuals are identical and they live infinite periods of time and have 
countless number of consumption choices. However, the marginal utility of spending a 
dollar on any good or service other than X is one. While a consumer consumes xq units of 
X, the perceived utility (U) of the consumer is represented as follows. 
ܷ = ݍఏݔ௤ଵିఏ , where 0 < ߠ < 1    (1) 
 T Consumers have preferences for environmental attributes of their consumption. Let the 
price of X is Pq. We therefore can represent the consumer surplus as, 
    ܥܵ௤ = ݍఏݔ௤ଵିఏ − ௤ܲݔ௤    (2) 
The optimal consumption decision that maximizes consumer surplus is  
ݔ௤ = ݍ ൬ଵିఏ௉೜ ൰
భ
ഇ
      (3) 
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Therefore, the consumption of X is proportional to its environmental quality and 
decreases with price. Using equation (2), the consumer surplus can be expressed as, 
ܥܵ௤ = ܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ      (4) 
Here, ܣ = ሺ1 − ߠሻభషഇഇ − ሺ1 − ߠሻభഇ. 
 Adoption Criterion 
Let the producer needs to bear a sunk-cost Ke (Ke > 0) in order to adopt the green 
technology y. As the producer starts produce X with technology y, the product is 
classified as G with the additional environmental attributes. Quality of G is ݃′ and ݃′ >
ݍ. In order to recover the sunk-cost of technology switch, let the minimum price for G is 
Pg, ௚ܲ = ௤ܲ + ߝ and ߝ > 0. Suppose there are N identical consumers and the discounted 
present value of increase in total revenue from production of G is ܴఌ. Therefore, 
ܴఌ = ܰߝݔ௚ ሺ1 − ߚሻ൘ =
ܰߝ݃′ ൬ଵିఏ௉೒ ൰
భ
ഇ
ሺ1 − ߚሻ
൙      (5) 
The discount rate on future returns is ߚ and the optimal consumption of the representative 
consumer is ݔ௚.  
 Perceived Quality 
 The perceived environmental quality of a product depends on consumers’ 
preference for the environmental attributes in it. Hence, the realized (݃) and effective (݃′) 
environmental quality of G can be distinguished. 
݃ = ߣሺ݃′ሻ௕      (6) 
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In the above equation ߣ represents individuals’ preference for environmental attributes of 
their consumption.1 I consider no forgetting of information; a consumer does not change 
his/her opinion once he/she believes that G is better alternative than X.2 The fraction of 
population, who are in favor of G is b. Therefore, realized (݃) environmental quality of G 
increases as more people recognize G is a better alternative to X. 
 Quality Threshold 
 As there is sufficient market demand for G, production of X stops and the 
producer adopts y. Hence, the consumer surplus from G (ܥܵ௚) satisfies the condition: 
ܥܵ௚ > ܥܵ௤. It is decomposed to the condition 
݃ ≥ ݍ ൬௉೒௉೜൰
భషഇ
ഇ
      (7) 
However, the buyers are unable to judge the quality of ܩ until the production 
starts and the environmental impact of the eco-friendly production technology becomes 
visible (Cason and Gangadharan 2002). 
3. CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 Consumers are limited to two choices: a) continue consuming X or b) demand for 
G. The buyers do not rely on firms (Cason and Gangadharan 2002). They suspect that the 
producer of X may claim adoption of y and earn supernormal profit. Hence, it may be 
revealed that the quality of G is q. In accordance, I assume that as the consumers continue 
the consumption of X, the value of g is drawn from a normal distribution with mean q and 
                                                        
1 Please see Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990) and Narayan et al. (2011) for further details 
and explanation. 
 
2 Results hardly differ as buyers change their preference from G to X. 
  8
variance ߪଶ. They recognize the value of ݃ with a distribution ܨሺ݃ሻ and density ݂ሺ݃ሻ. 
Every period, they observe a signal ݖ. The signal has conditional density ℎሺݖ/݃ሻ and 
distribution ܪሺݖ/݃ሻ. That is, the signals depend on the unknown and true value of ݃′ and 
variance ߪ௭ଶ. Therefore, using the one-step-ahead Bayes map, the transition from ܨሺ݃ሻ to 
ܨ′ሺ݃ሻ is subject to corresponding signal obtained. 
݂ ′ሺ݃ሻ = ℎሺ௭/௚ሻ௙ሺ௚ሻ
׬ ℎሺ௭/௚ሻ௙ሺ௚ሻ೒∈ಸ
      (8) 
Now, let us assume the mean of received signals until period ݐ is ݖ௧ഥ . Following 
the standard formula (DeGroot 1970), the posterior belief of the representative consumer 
is normally distributed with mean and variance respectively as, 
݃௧തതത = ௧ఙ
మ௭೟ഥ ା௤ఙ೥మ
௧ఙమାఙ೥మ      (9) 
and 
ߪ௚,௧ଶ = ఙ
మఙ೥మ
௧ఙమାఙ೥మ      (10) 
Mapping the mean and variance for the next period can reproduce the transition of 
belief. Receiving the signal on (t+1)th period, zt+1, the consumer reviews his belief. 
Updated belief of the consumer is reflected exploiting the posterior mean (݃௧ାଵതതതതതത) and 
variance (ߪ௚,௧ାଵଶ ). 
݃௧ାଵതതതതതത = ௭೟శభఙ೒,೟
మ ା௚೟തതതఙ೥మ
ఙ೒,೟మ ାఙ೥మ
     (11) 
and 
ߪ௚,௧ାଵଶ = ఙ೒,೟
మ ఙ೥మ
ఙ೒,೟మ ାఙ೥మ
     (12) 
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The pair {݃௧തതത, ݐ} is sufficient statistic of belief Ft. The ultimate goal of the 
representative consumer is to maximize the discounted present value of expected future 
returns, or discounted present value of consumer surplus. The effect of these two 
deciding and opposite forces that determine the choice to switch are twofold. A) 
Uncertainty leads to an inferior expected consumer surplus on adoption of ݃௧തതത. Hence, as 
the uncertainty reduces over time (the posterior variance of belief decreases with time) 
with repeated signals, the expected return from switching starts improving. B) As the 
consumers wait for additional signals, current benefit from adoption of G is lost.  
The dynamics of the above two opposite forces, resolves the decision of the 
representative consumer. Using equation (10), 
ఋఙ೒,೟మ
ఋ௧ < 0 and 
ఋ൫ఙ೒,೟మ ൯మ
ఋమ௧ > 0            (13) 
That is, the uncertainty of the value of ݃ reduces at a decreasing rate over time. By the 
law of iterated expectation, expected quality of ܩ does not change in subsequent periods. 
Return from waiting one additional period, therefore, is positive, and reduces over time as 
uncertainty reduces.  
Let the representative consumer’s belief at period t is normally distributed with 
mean ݃௧തതത and variance ߪ௚,௧ଶ . Therefore, probability of ݃ = ݍ on period is, 
݌ሺ݃௧തതത, ݐሻ = ଵ
ටଶగఙ೒,೟మ
݁ି
ሺ೜ష೒೟തതതതሻమ
మ഑೒,೟మ      (14) 
By each period, loss in consumer surplus due to increase in price ( ௤ܲ to ௚ܲ) without any 
increase in quality (q) of consumption is, 
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ቈܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܣ݃൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ቉     (15) 
Therefore, the discounted present value of loss (L) in consumer surplus throughout the 
lifetime is, 
ܮ = ଵሺଵିఉሻ ቈܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܣ݃൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ቉     (16) 
Therefore, discounted present value of expected loss in consumer surplus due to false 
claim of green technology transfer by the producer and consumers’ approval to the claim 
at period t can be derived, multiplying equation (14) and (16). 
ܧ௧ሺܮሻ = ௣ሺ௚೟തതത,௧ሻሺଵିఉሻ ቈܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܣ݃൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ቉    (17) 
The value-function of an individual consuming can be expressed as follows.  
ܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ሻ = ݉ܽݔ ቈܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ + ߚܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ାଵሻ, ஺ሺଵିఉሻ ݃௧തതത൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܧ௧ሺܮሻ቉  (18) 
The above Bellman equation considers that a consumer's choice to stick to X or switch to 
G, is aimed at optimizing the present discounted value of future returns.  
As explained before, the option value from waiting decreases with higher 
precision as uncertainty reduces over time. That is, the risk of a wrong prediction 
decreases with increase in number of signals. Exploiting the Bellman equation, any 
consumers’ decision to prefer G to X meets the following condition. 
 ஺ሺଵିఉሻ ݃௧തതത൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܧ௧ሺܮሻ ≥ ܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ + ߚܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ାଵሻ   (19) 
Let the minimum value of ݃௧തതത, that satisfies the condition, is ݃௧∗. Therefore, 
஺
ሺଵିఉሻ ݃௧∗൫ ௚ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ − ܧ௧ሺܮሻ = ܣݍ൫ ௤ܲ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ + ߚܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ାଵሻ   (20) 
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The ݃௧∗ is the critical value of posterior mean or the mean value of a consumer’s 
belief that makes the consumers prefer G over X and wait for no additional signals. 
4. MARKOV TIME DISTRIBUTION  
 In order to analyze the time and the probability of green technology adoption 
through the choice of consumers’, I calculated the distribution of the Markov time. The 
Markov time, , can be explained in the following equation. 
ܶ = ݉݅݊݅݉ݑ݉ሼݐ: ݃௧തതത ≥ ݃௧∗ሽ     (21) 
To illustrate, Markov time is the minimum time required to convince a consumer that G 
is a better than X. 
The following is an example that will eventually be used to provide numerical 
comparisons of policies to encourage adoption of G. Let ߠ = 0.5, ݍ = 100 and ௤ܲ = 1. 
Using equation (3) and (4), ܣ = 0.25 and ݔ௤ = 25. Also, let true quality of y (݃′) is 144 
and the discount rate on future returns (ߚ) is 0.95. The cost of technology transfer (ܭ௘) is 
10,000. The number of consumers (N) is assumed 100. Hence, in order to compensate the 
cost of technology switch, increase in vending price (ߝ) is 0.2. Therefore, ௚ܲ = 1.2. 
Standard errors of initial belief (ߪ) and signals received (ߪ௭) are both 10.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of critical value of posterior mean over time 
 
ݍ = 100, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲ = 1.2 
Uncertainty, over environmental attributes, reduces with increase in number of 
signals consumer receives. Therefore, as ݐ → ∞, uncertainty of the quality of G 
disappears. When return from environmental attribute is certain (ߪ௚,௧ଶ = 0), the critical 
value of posterior mean (݃௜௡௙∗ ) is 120, by equation (7). The value of ݃ஶ∗  is the asymptotic 
critical value of posterior mean. However, the uncertainty keeps the critical value of 
posterior mean (݃௧∗) over the asymptotic limit. The ݃௧∗ can be approximated by estimating 
the stopping rule illustrated in equation (20). Figure 1 provides a comparison of ݃௧∗ and 
݃௜௡௙∗ . As uncertainty diminishes with signals, ݃௧∗ tends to its asymptotic limit. The 
numerical approximation of ݃௧∗ is described in the appendix A.1. 
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Figure 2: Probability distribution of Markov time 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣ = 114, ܾ = 0, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲ = 1.2 
The first passage problem (illustrate it) and probability distribution of Markov 
time, itself, is an exciting subject of statistical research. Several researchers have 
estimated distribution of Markov with numerical measure and usually consider that ݖ௧ 
and ݃௧തതത can only take certain discrete values (Ardia 2009; Strigul et al. 2012). Assuming 
that the signals follow normal distribution with mean ݃ and variance ߪ௭ଶ, I have described 
the approximation process of the probability distribution of Markov time ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ in 
appendix A.2. Figure 2 plots the ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ over time. As the probability reaches one, it 
indicates adoption of G by the entire population. 
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5. POLICY DISCUSSION 
 The consumers may prefer G to X for individual or social reasons. Therefore, 
policies may target either individual wellbeing or aggregate social benefit, or both. 
Following are different aspects that affect the adoption-probability of G and the 
underlying green technology (y). 
 Awareness 
Consumers are different in preference for environmental quality (Luechinger 
2009; Lo and Spash 2012), so as their willingness to pay for environmental attributes in 
consumption. As people may undervalue the importance of the environment, studies 
often recommend decision of a ‘social planner’ (Selden and Song 1995; McConnell 
1997) to avoid suboptimal social welfare. While buyers are entitled to make their own 
choices, decisions of a social planner cannot be imposed or are limited in application. It is 
therefore important and practical to encourage pro-environmental concern of people. 
Plastic, for example, is always a concern for the environment. The usage of plastic 
bags has reached the scale by trillions. The Guinness Book of World Records (2010) has 
named plastic bag ‘the most ubiquitous consumer product’. Market price of plastic bags 
fails to reflect its true cost to society. Single-use plastic bags adversely affect the fishing, 
shipping and tourism industries, and cost developing and industrialized nations up to $1.3 
billion annually. State agencies in California spend around $25 million to clean up single-
use plastic bags. Recycling and managing used plastic bags always put enormous amount 
of stress on waste management in India (Talyan et al. 2008). Irrespective of several 
attempts to ban plastic bags, massive market demand encourages its illegal manufacturing 
and supply. S Shivappa, Chairman of health committee Bangalore City Corporation 
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(BCC), was quoted saying "Mass awareness is a must, so we have decided to educate 
them through newspapers and pamphlets" in Times of India on 28th June 2001. The 
awareness agenda S Shivappa mentioned was for citizens of Bangalore, as BCC was 
planning to outlaw use of plastic bags less wide than 20 microns. Such evidences 
establish the importance of consumers’ awareness encouraging environment friendly 
practices.  
Following equation (6), decrease in environmental concern can be reflected 
through decrease in the value of ߣ. As plotted in Figure (3), adoption of G is never 
possible when value of ߣ decreases to 110. As ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ never reaches one, it reflects that 
everyone do not believe in adoption of G. Therefore, even a better innovation of 
technology fails to successfully replace its substandard substitute as a result of lack of 
sufficient concern for the environment. 
Figure 3: Probability distribution of Markov time as ‘Concern’ decreases 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣሺ↓ሻ = 114 ݐ݋ 110, ܾ = 0, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲ = 1.2 
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Banning vs. Penalizing 
 Adoption of G is not always the optimal decision of consumers with preference 
for private gain. Also, as learning ݃′ may take too long, environment policies often set 
rules to ensure adoption of green technologies. Rules can be as rigorous as banning or 
penalizing non-environment friendly products and technologies. Banning is not always 
feasible due to social restraints. Setting rules and regulations involves significant 
administrative concern. Bureaucrats may face severe public protest, while setting and 
enforcing rules. Rules and regulation may also be introduced to collect bribes (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). Preventing marketing of a regular consumer products, also involves 
problem of black marketing. Charles W. Schmidt (2004) has cited several examples of 
illegal transactions related to environmental issues ranging from illegal trading of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to logging. Therefore, legal restriction on consumption of X 
may not be feasible as long as it has sufficient market demand.   
Pollution taxes, such as ‘Carbon Tax’, can be referred in this context (Mathieu et 
al. 2012). Carbon tax increases cost of production with emission. Hence, emission 
reducing production technologies get adopted sooner than before. Let the pollution tax 
increases the price of X by 10% (from 1 to 1.1). If so, the relative price of G decreases. In 
other words, it costs consumers less to change their consumption habit. Hence, adoption 
of y becomes faster. Figure 4 explains the adjustment in ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ and demonstrates how 
y gets adopted one period earlier. 
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Figure 4: Probability distribution of Markov time as ௤ܲ increases 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣ = 114, ܾ = 0, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲሺ↑ሻ = 1 ݐ݋ 1.1, ௚ܲ = 1.2 
 Price Subsidy 
 Diverse regulations by the government reduce producers’ cost of environment 
friendly changes in production technology or market price of consumption with salient 
environmental benefit. For example, lighting at business facilities accounts for 20 percent 
of all electricity sold in the United States. Still, the organizations seldom treat lighting as 
an opportunity for investment. The ‘Green Lights’ program promotes energy efficient 
lighting. Once a firm joins the Green Lights program, government provides assistance 
that reduces firms’ cost of energy-efficient green lights. Similarly, the Direct and 
Counter-Cyclical Payment Program (DCP), administered by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA), made payments available for 
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agricultural and forest sources of biomass production on private lands.3 Additional 
subsidy programs are also available for conversion of biomass into energy.4 Clearly, such 
subsidy policies keep the cost of G less than otherwise. 
Let a subsidy program reduces ௚ܲ by 10% (from 1.2 to 1.08). Figure 5 explains 
this policy helps in adoption of y. As G becomes less expensive, ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ visibly 
increases and y is adopted one period earlier.  
Figure 5: Probability distribution of Markov time as ௚ܲ decreases 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣ = 114, ܾ = 0, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = .25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲሺ↓ሻ = 1.2 ݐ݋ 1.08 
  
 
                                                        
3 Please visit http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/2011corsorsoylr.pdf for more 
information. 
 
4 Additional information is available at: 
http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/subsidies/.  
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Information 
 Environmental pollution is often an unrecognized byproduct of our economic 
activities. However, we often fail to recognize and measure the impacts of these actions. 
As we strive for effective options for mitigating damaging impacts of pollution, 
information can play some critical roles. Reducing information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers can potentially facilitate environment friendly behaviors. Firms 
are often required to communicate environment-related information with their consumers, 
which at the same time can manifest the environmental track record of businesses. Eco-
labels, for example, can make the product market more transparent (Crespi and Marrette 
2005; Liere and Thidell 2005). Eco-labels have expanded from a mere dozen worldwide 
in the 1990s to more than 430 programs today.5 Mandatory and voluntary corporate 
disclosure systems are increasing in applications and they replace or augment 
government regulations (Khanna 2001; Delmas and Montiel 2009).  
However, reliability of information is crucial for making these programs effective. In 
essence, reliability of signals is reflected by their variance. The closer the signal is to the 
actual value, the stronger the consumer’s expectation. It can be promptly spotted that if 
signals reflect only the true value adoption is immediate to availability. Instant adoption, 
though, is hardly possible. Let us suppose that variance of signals (ߪ௭ଶ) decreases from 
100 to 25. The change in adoption behavior is shown in Figure 6. Probability of adoption 
clearly increases, as variance of the signals decreases.  
                                                        
5 Please visit www.ecolabelindex.com for details. 
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Figure 6: Probability distribution of Markov time as ߪ௭ decreases 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣ = 114, ܾ = 0, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ሺ↓ሻ = 10 ݐ݋ 5, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲ = 1.2 
Diffusion of knowledge is another mechanism of information disclosure. 
Bollinger (2010) has explained adoption of green cleaning techniques by setting 
demonstration sites. Cantono and Silverberg (2009) have argued the reservation price (the 
maximum price a consumer agrees to pay) increases with number of existing consumers. 
Diffusion gives the consumers the opportunity to share others’ experience and learn the 
purpose they are paying for. Equation (6) incorporates this concern and explains that the 
consumers are willing to spend more as they witness others spending on the same 
products. Realized improvement in environmental quality is subject to the fraction of the 
population in favor of G. If one percent of the population is convinced to adopt G with 
external means, adoption is possible in the situation described in figure (3). It is worth 
noticing that a small fraction of population helps an entire community to learn the benefit 
of G as shown in Figure 7, which results in adoption of technology g. 
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Figure 7: Diffusion of knowledge and probability distribution of Markov time 
 
ݍ = 100, ݃′ = 144, ߣ = 110, ܾ = 0.1, ߪ = 10, ߪ௭ = 10, ܣ = 0.25, ௤ܲ = 1, ௚ܲ = 1.2  
6.  Conclusion 
 The objective of this paper is to explain how sufficient market demand often 
results to adoption of eco-friendly technologies. Consumers’ preference for salient 
environmental attributes in goods and services substitutes existing technologies with eco-
friendly production processes. Adoption of green technologies is possible either by 
increase in consumers’ concern for the environment, or by making it affordable for 
potential buyers. Although such technologies need to satisfy a threshold, adoption 
depends on a critical mass of society’s concern for environmental protection. People may 
be interested even for minor environmental benefit if they are concerned enough. 
If q and g are known qualities, consumer surplus from adoption of G can 
represent the magnitude of social welfare. The model can be extended to understand 
effectiveness of an adoption policy that results acceptance of G earlier enough to 
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compensate the underlying cost of its implementation. Increase in research and 
development expenditure (R&D) and market size also helps adoption of green 
technologies. Increase in R&D improves quality of G and increase in potential market 
size decreases average burden on consumers. Since this study explains policy 
implications with existing market size for known quality of green technology, I have not 
raised these concerns. Still, they can be easily incorporated into the framework.  
The model can be useful to evaluate a host of policy prescriptions for promoting 
adoption of green technologies. Further extension of this model may consider coexistence 
of green (x) and brown (y) in production. Also, while consumers learn the benefit from 
green products, producers also explore the potential market for their environmental 
preferences n. Therefore, future researchers may investigate a mechanism that can model 
and explain the simultaneous learning by the producers and consumers.
  23
REFERENCES: 
Amacher, G. S., Koskela, E., & Ollikainen, M. (2004). Environmental quality 
competition and eco-labeling. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
47(2), 284-306. 
Ardia, D. (2009). Bayesian estimation of a Markov‐switching threshold asymmetric 
GARCH model with Student‐t innovations. The Econometrics Journal, 12(1), 105-126. 
Baker, L. C. (2001). Managed care and technology adoption in health care: evidence 
from magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Health Economics, 20(3), 395-421. 
Bala, V., & Goyal, S. (1998). Learning from neighbours. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 65(3), 595-621. 
Bala, V., & Goyal, S. (2001). Conformism and diversity under social learning. Economic 
Theory, 17(1), 101-120. 
Bessen, J., & Maskin, E. (2009). Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 40(4), 611-635. 
Bollinger, B. (2010). Green Technology Adoption: An Empirical Study of the Southern 
California Garment Cleaning Industry. Available at http://web-
docs.stern.nyu.edu/marketing/BBollingerPaper.pdf. Accessed 29th march 2013. 
Bonini, S. M., Hintz, G., & Mendonca, L. T. (2008). Addressing consumer concerns 
about climate change. McKinsey Quarterly, 2, 52. 
Bordigoni, M., Hita, A., & Le Blanc, G. (2012). Role of embodied energy in the 
European manufacturing industry: Application to short-term impacts of a carbon tax. 
Energy Policy. 
Cantono, S., & Silverberg, G. (2009). A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: 
the relationship between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 76(4), 487-496. 
Cason, T. N., & Gangadharan, L. (2002). Environmental labeling and incomplete 
consumer information in laboratory markets. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 43(1), 113-134. 
Chatterjee, R. A., & Eliashberg, J. (1990). The innovation diffusion process in a 
heterogeneous population: A micromodeling approach. Management Science, 36(9), 
1057-1079. 
Chen, C. (2001). Design for the environment: A quality-based model for green product 
development. Management Science, 47(2), 250-263. 
Coad, A., De Haan, P., & Woersdorfer, J. S. (2009). Consumer support for environmental 
policies: An application to purchases of green cars. Ecological Economics, 68(7), 2078-
2086. 
  24
Crespi, J. M., & Marette, S. (2005). Eco-labelling economics: is public involvement 
necessary. Environment, information and consumer behaviour. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 93-109. 
DeGroot, M. H. (2005). Optimal statistical decisions (Vol. 82). Wiley-interscience. 
Delmas, M., & Montiel, I. (2009). Greening the supply chain: when is customer pressure 
effective?. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 18(1), 171-201. 
Dosi, C., & Moretto, M. (2001). Is ecolabelling a reliable environmental policy measure?. 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 18(1), 113-127. 
Ek, K. (2005). Public and private attitudes towards “green” electricity: the case of 
Swedish wind power. Energy Policy, 33(13), 1677-1689. 
Gang, K., & Abetti, P. A. (2010). The global competitiveness of South Korea: the role of 
government-funded research institutes. World Review of Science, Technology and 
Sustainable Development, 8(1), 1-28. 
Gilg, A., Barr, S., & Ford, N. (2005). Green consumption or sustainable lifestyles? 
Identifying the sustainable consumer. Futures, 37(6), 481-504. 
Guinness Book of World Records (2010) Top 100 records of the decade: Most ubiquitous 
consumer item. Available at: http://2010.guinnessworldrecords.com (Accessed on 1/7/10) 
Hartmann, W. R. (2006). Intertemporal effects of consumption and their implications for 
demand elasticity estimates. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 4(4), 325-349. 
Jacob, B., Welch, E., & Simms, T. (2009). Emergent Management Strategies in a Public 
Agency: A Case Study of Alternative Fuel Vehicles. Public Organization Review, 9(3), 
213-234. 
Jaeger, S. R., Rossiter, K. L., Wismer, W. V., & Harker, F. R. (2003). Consumer-driven 
product development in the kiwifruit industry. Food Quality and Preference, 14(3), 187-
198. 
Jaffe, A. B., Newell, R. G., & Stavins, R. N. (2002). Environmental policy and 
technological change. Environmental and Resource Economics, 22(1), 41-70. 
Jørgensen, S., Martín-Herrán, G., & Zaccour, G. (2010). Dynamic games in the 
economics and management of pollution. Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 
15(6), 433-467. 
Kelly, D. L., & Kolstad, C. D. (1999). Bayesian learning, growth, and pollution. Journal 
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 23(4), 491-518. 
Khanna, M. (2001). Non‐mandatory approaches to environmental protection. Journal of 
economic surveys, 15(3), 291-324. 
Kirchhoff, S. (2000). Green business and blue angels. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 15(4), 403-420. 
  25
Laroche, M., Bergeron, J., & Barbaro-Forleo, G. (2001). Targeting consumers who are 
willing to pay more for environmentally friendly products. Journal of consumer 
marketing, 18(6), 503-520. 
Leire, C., & Thidell, Å. (2005). Product-related environmental information to guide 
consumer purchases–a review and analysis of research on perceptions, understanding and 
use among Nordic consumers. Journal of Cleaner Production, 13(10), 1061-1070. 
Lo, A. Y., & Spash, C. L. (2012). Deliberative monetary valuation: in search of a 
democratic and value plural approach to environmental policy. Journal of Economic 
Surveys. 
Luechinger, S. (2009). Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach. The 
Economic Journal, 119(536), 482-515. 
Mahajan, V., Muller, E., & Bass, F. M. (1990). New product diffusion models in 
marketing: A review and directions for research. The Journal of Marketing, 1-26. 
McConnell, K. E. (1997). Income and the demand for environmental quality. 
Environment and Development Economics, 2(4), 383-399. 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990). The economics of modern manufacturing: 
Technology, strategy, and organization. The American Economic Review, 511-528.  
Mostafa, M. M. (2007). A hierarchical analysis of the green consciousness of the 
Egyptian consumer. Psychology and Marketing, 24(5), 445-473. 
Nagamachi, M. (1995). Kansei engineering: a new ergonomic consumer-oriented 
technology for product development. International Journal of industrial ergonomics, 
15(1), 3-11. 
Narayan, V., Rao, V. R., & Saunders, C. (2011). How peer influence affects attribute 
preferences: A Bayesian updating mechanism. Marketing Science, 30(2), 368-384. 
Omer, A. M. (2009). Energy use and environmental impacts: A general review. Journal 
of Renewable and Sustainable Energy, 1, 053101. 
Pindyck, R. S. (2002). Optimal timing problems in environmental economics. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 26(9), 1677-1697. 
Pindyck, R. S. (2007). Uncertainty in environmental economics. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 1(1), 45-65. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). The link between competitive advantage and 
corporate social responsibility. Harvard business review, 84(12), 78-92. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy (pp. 49-71). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Schmidt, C. W. (2004). Environmental crimes: profiting at earth's expense. 
Environmental Health Perspectives, 112(2), A96-103. 
  26
Selden, T. M., & Song, D. (1995). Neoclassical growth, the J curve for abatement, and 
the inverted U curve for pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
management, 29(2), 162-168. 
Strigul, N., Florescu, I., Welden, A. R., & Michalczewski, F. (2012). Modelling of forest 
stand dynamics using Markov chains. Environmental Modelling & Software. 
Swallow SK, Sedjo RA (2000) Eco-labeling consequences in general equilibrium: A 
graphical assessment. Land Economics 76: 28-36 
Talyan, V., Dahiya, R. P., & Sreekrishnan, T. R. (2008). State of municipal solid waste 
management in Delhi, the capital of India. Waste management, 28(7), 1276-1287. 
Tarui, N., & Polasky, S. (2005). Environmental regulation with technology adoption, 
learning and strategic behavior. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
50(3), 447-467. 
Valentini, L. (2009). Environmental quality provision and eco-labelling: some issues. 
Van den Bergh, J. C. (2010). Environmental and climate innovation: Limitations, prices 
and policies (No. 1023). Papers on economics and evolution. 
Von Hippel, E. (1986). Lead users: a source of novel product concepts. Management 
science, 32(7), 791-805. 
von Stechow, C., Watson, J., & Praetorius, B. (2011). Policy incentives for carbon 
capture and storage technologies in Europe: A qualitative multi-criteria analysis. Global 
Environmental Change, 21(2), 346-357. 
York, J. G., & Venkataraman, S. (2010). The entrepreneur–environment nexus: 
Uncertainty, innovation, and allocation. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(5), 449-463. 
  27
APPENDIX 
Computation of Posterior Means 
For numerical estimation of  ݃௧തതത, a vector of discrete values with reasonable 
difference (0.01) between each other is created in the beginning. It is assumed that ݃௧തതത 
takes the discrete values in the assigned vector. The minimum value of ݃௧തതത that meets the 
condition explained in equation (19) is the critical value of posterior belief to adoption of 
y. It is subject to a dynamic optimization problem as ܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ାଵሻ depends on the value of 
ܸሺݍ, ܨ௧ሻ. The variance of posterior belief evolves in the process described in equation 
(11). 
  28
Distribution of Markov Time 
 In order to numerically estimate ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ, I generate large number of streams of 
signals those are normally distributed with mean ݃ and variance ߪ௭ଶ. The process creates 
a matrix of ܵ × ܯ; M is number of streams generated and S is the final period to switch. 
For sufficiently large value of S, uncertainty tends to zero by the final period. The 
consumers get sufficient number of periods to decide if they want to adopt G or not. I set 
S=31 and the probability distribution of Markov time, ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ, does not change as I 
increase the final period to decide (S) or the number of streams (M). Therefore, the results 
are consistent with increase in S and M. Since S represents t, from equation (9) starting 
from the first (t =1) for each row I compute, 
ݖ௧ഥ =
݃௧തതതሺݐߪଶ + ߪ௭ଶሻ − ݍߪ௭ଶ
ݐߪଶ  
Let, for mt out of M columns, ݖ௧ഥ ≥ ݖ௧ഥ ∗. Therefore, I conclude that ܲሺݐ = ܶሻ = ௠೟ெ . Since I 
consider no forgetting, as a consumer makes his/her mind, he/she does not change 
preference. Therefore, 
ܲሺݐ ≥ ܶሻ = ൝
݉௧
ܯ ݂݅ ݐ = 1
ܲሺݐ − 1 ≥ ܶሻ + ሼ1 − ܲሺݐ − 1 ≥ ܶሻሽܲሺݐ = ܶሻ ݂݅ ݐ > 1
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CHAPTER II:  
POLLUTION TAX, HEALTH INSURANCE AND INFORMATION: A POLICY 
EXPERIMENT FOR PROMOTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this research I address the question whether residential energy conservation can 
be encouraged with public policy, and not private cost of electricity. I also address the 
inherent relation between energy conservation and health insurance as fossil fuel based 
power plants are major source of electricity, causing enough emission of green-house 
gases to increase health risk. During the study, 128 students of Florida International 
University were recruited to take part in 16 experimental sessions. Every session had 8 
distinct participants. There were four parallel experimental setups, differentiated in 
combinations of option to buy health insurance and monitor others’ choices. Every 
session was constituted of 3 sections of 30 decision-making rounds.  While the 
participants pay a lump sum pollution-tax on every round of the 1st and 3rd section, it is 
proportional to the group expenditure on energy consumption during the 2nd section. The 
study reveals energy saving innate nature of people in response to health insurance and 
information, and compare relative benefit of proportional and lump sum pollution tax to 
group energy expenditure. 
Environmental risks are often manmade, caused by pesticides, chemicals, 
radiation, air pollution, and water pollution. Such environmental degradations may cause 
anatomical or functional damages, irreversible physical changes and an increase in 
susceptibility to other biological, chemical or environmental stresses (Smith 1996; Wilby 
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2008; Luber 2008; Hill et al. 2009). Environmental protection programs, such as 
reduction in emission of greenhouse gases, are therefore a major area of researchers’ 
attention (Haines et al. 2009). Combustion of fossil fuels is a major source of growing 
energy demand in the United States (U. S. Energy Information Administration 2012), 
causing emission of harmful greenhouse gases. According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 22% of total energy in the United States was generated by 
burning coal in 2011.6 Particle pollution from existing coal power plants in the United 
States caused 13,200 premature deaths, 9,700 additional hospitalizations, and 20,000 
heart attacks only in 2010 (Schneider and Banks 2010). The health-related damages, 
associated with air pollution from coal-fired power plants only, are estimated to cost 
more than $102 billion per year. Therefore, I discuss how to include altruistic values of 
energy conservation in a controlled lab-based behavioral experiment.  
Human efforts to reduce emission, lead to environmental contribution and/or 
environment-responsible consumption choices. Buying carbon offsets is one of the 
simplest examples of environmental contribution, as the fund is utilized in projects like 
wind farms and replaces energy from fossil fuels.7 Often consumers weigh quality of 
products over their environmental impacts, and pay more for what they perceive 
environmentally friendly (Ghazali and Simula 1997; Wasik 1996). Such consumption 
behavior is considered environment-responsible. Impure Public Goods (IPGs), in 
contrast, carry an environmental contribution and save money at the same time (Kotchen 
                                                        
6 Please visit http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ for further information. 
 
7 The airlines include a mandatory or optional contribution for carbon offsets in their 
flight tickets. Visit http://southafrica.to/transport/Airlines/Carbon-neutral-flight/Carbon-
neutral-flight.php5 for details. 
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et al. 2003; Kotchen 2005). For example, fuel-efficient and/or hybrid vehicles cause less 
emissions with a smaller gasoline engine and save money on gas in comparison to their 
non-fuel efficient counterparts. Consumers of such vehicles therefore enjoy automobiles 
with lower gas consumption (private benefit) and reduced air emissions (environmental 
benefit). Most of the energy efficient residential installations fall in the same class of 
IPGS. Despite of their benefit, IPGs are still not popular choice of consumption. 
Environmental cost of consumption is often not reflected in retail prices of common 
merchandises. Therefore, non-environment friendly products are relatively inexpensive to 
IPGs (Morgan 2008). The price-gap is even higher since IPGs are relatively modern 
technologies. People are short sighted and underestimate future returns as a consequence 
of inconsistent high short-term discount rate (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). The 
transaction costs of searching for and processing information (Jaccard et al. 2003; Wirl 
2000), sensitivity to changes in attributes of energy services, and relative insignificance 
of energy costs as a proportion of total expenditure (Brown 2001; Levine et al. 1995; 
Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sutherland 1991) also result in market failure of energy saving 
IPGs. 
Researchers of psychological and contextual characterization, offer specific 
lessons for interventions that reduce residential energy use. For example, the utility-based 
decision literature discusses how to reduce residential energy use in two distinct 
approaches: economic engineering analysis and discrete choice modeling (Wilson and 
Dowlatabadi 2007). A rational individual’s preference is guided by monetary cost-benefit 
analysis in the economic engineering analysis (Gayer and Viscusi 2012). Energy saving 
IPGs are relatively expensive and may face limited market success. The economic 
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engineering analysis justifies market potential of such goods owing to their energy-
efficiency gap (Mundaka et al. 2010). Their justification, however, turns out to limited 
success. Common interventions the economic engineering analysis suggests are, increase 
in per-unit cost of voltage (Gillingham et al. 2009) and price cut of energy efficient IPGs 
(Fuller et al. 2009). Still, their market acceptance is subject to limited success. A quest 
for an alternative explanation reveals several limitations of the economic engineering 
analysis. They are constant discount rate on future returns (Andrikopoulos 2012) and 
undiversified nonfinancial costs (Horne et al. 2005). Homogenous financial value does 
not recognize heterogeneity of decision-makers. Therefore, a stronger encouragement on 
social values for energy conservation becomes practically important (Stern 1999). It leads 
to the discrete choice models that capture choice dynamics. The discrete choice models 
guide the conscience of people (Dietz et al. 2009), to ensure market acceptance of 
energy-efficient appliances (Goulder and Parry 2009). We can refer to studies of value-
belief-norm for example. Value-belief-norm of behavioral studies proposes a causal 
chain of human behavior with specific beliefs and responsibilities (Stern 2000). Social 
norms are personal obligations to act in a way that reduces adverse consequences (Groot 
and Steg 2009). It is related to self-expectations, and behavioral changes (Turaga et al. 
2010).  
In a laboratory based (at Florida International University, Miami, Florida) impure 
public good decision game, this paper presents the first systematic review of energy 
saving decision-making. Controlled laboratory based behavioral experiments can detail a 
decision scenario, while the key findings can be exploited to design real life policy 
interventions that improve energy saving behavior of the nation (Camerer 2004). 
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However, an appropriate context must be selected to match particular decision 
characteristics. Although the decision-making and behavioral literature is enriched in 
social science, the models widely vary in their basic assumptions, independent variables, 
structures and scales. The research tradition centers on an individual as the decision-
maker, while sociologists question the relevance of individually framed decision models 
and emphasize the social and technological construction of behavior (Wilson and 
Dowlatabadi 2007). In an attempt, I introduce a pollution liability tax policy that aims the 
public benefit of energy conservation. While an expert opinion suggests consumption of 
energy saving appliances, the rule of thumb such as do not waste leads to a deviation 
from the expert model (Thaler 1980; Mogilner and Aaker 2009). Therefore, I discuss 
how emphasize on common benefit changes people’s behavior and increases energy 
saving. In an attempt to integrate financial limitation to market acceptance of energy-
saving residential installations because of non-monetary cost of adoption, I have 
considered energy-saving residential investments are non-beneficial in absence of social 
benefit in the decision-making experiment. I have also addressed the implicit relation 
between health insurance on energy conservation, which has never come to the 
researchers’ notice.  
I have explained this study in following sections. The second section describes the 
experimental design. The non-parametric estimation result is discussed in the third 
section. The third and fourth sections describe participants’ characteristics and discuss 
the estimation results, respectively. I have discussed the findings in the sixth section.  
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2. ENERGY SAVING EXPERIMENT 
During the study, 128 subjects were recruited at the south campus of Florida 
International University (Miami, Florida). Subjects were undergraduate or graduate 
students, and participated in one of 16 decision-making sessions in groups (8 subjects per 
group). University students were informed that a session would last for 2 hours and they 
could earn $10 to $50 on the basis of decisions they made. Subjects were recruited on 
first come first serve basis and assigned to designated-computers upon arrival. 
Instructions were read and explained every session.8 Subjects were not allowed to 
communicate among themselves during the experiment. I designed four parallel 
experimental setups, to find possible impact of health insurance and information on 
energy saving choices. The decision-making experiments are described in the following 
subsections. 
 Experiment One 
Experiment one is divided in 3 sections, 30 rounds each. Every round represents a 
year, and each section stands for a stretch of 30 years (Table 1). The experimental set-up 
is described in Figure 8. In the beginning of every section, subjects are given a savings 
account balance of $60,000. In addition, they earn a $50,000/round salary and a 3% 
annual interest on their savings account balance. Subjects also have expenses, 
$30,000/round on everyday necessities, $2,000/round of electricity-bill, and $300/round 
of environmental tax (Green Tax). Subjects may choose to reduce their energy bill with 
long-term clean energy-generating installations (ESCLT) and short-term energy saving 
choices (ESCST). Once installed, ESCLT are effective for the remaining section (all 
                                                        
8 Experimental detailed instructions are available on request. 
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remaining rounds). There are three ESCLT: Geothermal Heat Pump (GHP), Residential 
Wind Turbine (RWT), and Residential Solar Energy System (RSES). Installation costs of 
GHP, RWT and RSES are $7000, $8000, and $15000, and they save $200, $200, and 
$400 of energy bill every round, respectively. There are two ESCST, Energy Efficient 
Lighting (EEL) and Energy-Conservation Behavior and Energy Efficient Appliances 
(ECB), effective for one round only. The costs of EEL and ECB are $100 and $200, and 
they save $60 and $140 of energy bill.9 
Subjects are at a health-risk, 60% probable every round. As a subject gets exposed 
to the risk, half the times it is too trivial to cause any medical expenditure (see Figure 10). 
In 47% of the cases when a subject gets exposed to the risk, medical expenses are in the 
range of $1,000 and $5,000 (Minor sickness event; see Figure 11). Remaining 3% of the 
exposures to health-risk cause major medical expenses between $10,000 and $60,000 
(Major sickness event; see Figure 12).  
Energy production in the United States heavily depends on combustion of fossil 
fuels, which causes emission of greenhouse-gases and consequently increases the 
emission-related health-risk. Therefore, energy conservation reduces health-risk and 
every $200 reduction in group-energy-bill (total energy bill by eight subjects in one 
round) is set to reduce probability of the health-risk by 1% in the experiment. The major 
and minor sickness events consequently become less frequent (see Appendix).  
Thirty-two subjects participated in four sessions of Experiment One. While the 
first (Baseline) and the third (Repeated Baseline) sections are as explained as above, I 
                                                        
9 We have explained a particular decision made by a subject with ESCLT and ESCST in 
Figure 9. 
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apply either of the following two treatments in the second section (Treatment).   
A) Increasing Green Tax (IGT): The Green Tax increases to $500/round from 
$300/round following the 10th round, if the group energy bill does not drop by 30% (from 
$16,000 to $11,200). 
B) Decreasing Green Tax (DGT): Green Tax is $500/round for the first nine rounds. If 
the group energy bill drops by 30% by 10th round, Green Tax reduces to $300/round from 
$500/round. Green Tax is $500/round even after 10th round, if the group energy bill does 
not drop by 30%. 
I coordinated four sessions, two for each of the IGT and the DGT treatment. 
Subjects receive $1 (US dollar) for every $30,000 (Lab dollar) of their savings account 
balance after 30 rounds in one of the three sections, selected randomly.  
 Experiment Two 
Subjects may purchase one of two health insurance (HI) policies during 
Experiment Two. The first insurance policy (Ins1) has a $1,000 premium, and 35% co-
pay with $20,000 cap. The second insurance policy (Ins2) has a $1,300 premium, and 
10% co-pay with $5,000 cap. Both the insurance policies are effective for a round only. 
The energy saving choices and circumstances (see Figure 13), as well as number of 
sessions per treatment, remains the same as Experiment One.   
 Experiment Three 
During Experiment Three, subjects monitor others’ decisions (MOD) or observe 
the aggregate energy saving choices made by others (see Figure 14). The energy saving 
context, and number of sessions per treatment, remains the same as Experiment One. 
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 Experiment Four 
This is a combination of Experiment Two and Experiment Three. That is, subjects 
may purchase a health insurance policy and monitor the aggregate energy saving choices 
by others. I coordinated 4 sessions, 2 for each of IGT and the DGT treatment. 
3. NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION 
Table 2 reports the average energy conservation across sections and experiments. 
In 2 out of 4 experiments, average energy conservation is higher during IGT than the 
Baseline. Similarly, average energy conservation is higher during IGT than the Repeated 
Baseline in 3 out of 4 experiments. Decreasing Green Tax (DGT) treatment seems to be 
more efficient than IGT, as average energy saving is higher during DGT in 3 out of 4 
experiments with the Baseline and 4 out of 4 experiments with the Repeated Baseline.  
I have compared energy saving choices (ESC) across sections using six dummy 
variables. To get a better sense of them, Table 3 reports the dummy variables with their 
mean and standard deviation. Three of those dummies (GEOTHERMAL, WIND, and 
SOLAR) stand for the round (1 to 30) in which an ESCLT (GHP, RWT and RSES) is 
made, and set to 31 otherwise. Since ESCLT are effective for a section, lower entries 
(close to 1) of these dummies represent maximum energy saving. On average, subjects 
chose GHP, RWT, and RSES roughly on the 7th round, 10th round, and 7th round. LIGHT 
and APPLIANCE are two other dummy variables, which represent how many rounds (0 
to 30) a subject chooses EEL and ECB in 30 rounds of one section. Hence, less energy is 
saved as LIGHT and APPLIANCE take minor values (inclined to 0). On average, subjects 
choose EEL and ECB approximately for 16 and 18 rounds every section. The last dummy 
variable I generated, EXPENDITURE, is a subject’s undiscounted total expenditure on 
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ESC. There is one value of each dummy and for every section. Therefore each dummy 
has 384 observations (128 subjects x 3 sections) in total.   
I have reported significant difference in ESC in response to IGT, DGT, HI, and 
MOD using the Wilcoxon signed-rank and rank-sum test and t-Test in Table 4. Since the 
same set of subjects made decisions for three sections (Baseline, Treatment, and 
Repeated Baseline), I used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to find comparative energy 
saving benefit of IGT and DGT (Treatment) over Baseline and Repeated Baseline. In 
contrast, I find impact of HI and MOD with Wilcoxon ranked-sum test as different sets of 
subjects participated across four experiments (Muenchen and Hilbe 2010). The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test shows rare implication of earlier or frequent energy saving long-term or 
short-term choices in response to IGT. Although I find significant evidence that RWT 
and RSES are chosen earlier (p < 0.07) during IGT treatment compared to the Baseline, 
the result is lost as I do a t-Test. However, earlier choice of RSES is significant by both 
Wilcoxon signed-rank and t-Test, compared to the Repeated Baseline (p < 0.07). 
Effectiveness of DGT treatment is equivalent. Although there is indication of choosing 
RSES earlier during DGT than the Baseline (p < 0.00), it is inconsistent with t-Test 
result. Earlier choice of RSES is significant by both the Wilcoxon signed-rank and t-Test, 
as compared to the Repeated Baseline (p < 0.02). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also 
indicates frequent choice of ESCST as DGT is in effect, compared to the Repeated 
Baseline (p < 0.01). Except for the RSES, there is strong evidence that ESCLT are delayed 
and ESCST are chosen less frequently as subjects have choice to purchase health 
insurance (p < 0.08) both by the Wilcoxon rank-sum and t-Test. The undiscounted total 
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expenditure on ESC also significantly decreases (p < 0.00) in response to HI. There is no 
or incompatible evidence of MOD’s effectiveness by Wilcoxon rank-sum and t-Test.  
A visual representation of average energy conservation across 30 rounds, for 
different sections and decision-making set-ups, is given in Figure 15. It can be seen that 
average energy conservation is higher across 30 rounds during the 2nd section (IGT or 
DGT), compared to the 1st and 3rd section (Baseline and Repeated Baseline). Average 
energy saving during the DGT section, however, gets close and even below the average 
energy saving during the baseline following the 22nd round. Also, average energy 
conservation is lower every round as subjects have the option to buy HI, irrespective of 
whether they monitor others decisions and not. Average energy conservation is clearly a 
lesser amount as subjects monitor others’ decisions (MOD) all 30 rounds, in absence of 
option to buy HI. In presence of option to buy HI, average energy conservation increases 
faster while subjects monitor others’ decision, and exceeds average energy conservation 
while subjects do not monitor others’ decision by 18th round.     
4. CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES 
Energy efficiency reduces emission of greenhouse-gases and consequently lowers 
the emission-related health-risk. Therefore, individual risk preference may be critical in 
energy saving choices made by subjects. I elicited subjects’ risk-aversion using the Holt 
and Laury’s mechanism (Holt and Laury 2002). Energy saving choices of subjects may 
change based on their social and demographic characteristics also. Hence the subjects 
replied to a survey of 12 questions, which elaborates their human ecology and document 
their diverse perspectives about the importance of energy conservation.  
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The subject specific characteristic variables are clarified in Table 5. Of the 128 
subjects, 61 were female and 67 were male. Their average age was 26, in the middle of 
18 rounds and 39 rounds. Among the subjects 24 are White, 10 are African-American, 41 
are Hispanic, 52 are Asian, and one is American Indian. I also took account of their round 
of study as 3 of them were freshman, 6 were sophomore, 18 were junior, 26 were senior, 
and 75 were graduate student. Beside their round at school, they also informed their 
major. Academic major of 23 subjects was Economics, 12 subjects had major in Social 
Science other than Economics, 22 subjects were in Math, Statistics, Computer Science or 
Engineering, 39 subjects were in Natural Science, 4 subjects were in Business, 9 subjects 
were in Arts, and 29 subjects had major in other academic disciplines. The subjects also 
chose their party affiliation: Democrat, Republican, and Independent. While 46 of the 
subjects identified their political affiliation as Democrats, 71 were Republic and 11 were 
Independent. Special emphasis was placed on documenting diverse concern for the 
environment and the society, and on belief that conservation of energy saves the 
environment. On a scale of 5 points (0 to 4), subjects were asked to rank their concern for 
the society and for the environment, where 0 represents ‘very concerned’ and 4 stands for 
‘not at all concerned’. Similarly, subjects articulated themselves in belief that 
‘conservation of energy saves the environment’ and ‘environmental pollution causes 
health issues’ on a scale of 0 to 4. The scale reads, ‘0 = Really believe so’ and ‘4 = Do 
not believe so, at all’. On average, subjects seem to be very concerned for the society and 
the environment. They also seem to believe that conservation of energy saves the 
environment and environmental pollution causes health issues.  
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5. PANEL DATA ESTIMATION  
The between subject and group design of the experiment implies treatments and 
groups will be highly correlated. In regression analysis, simply including a group identity 
variable for different sessions would obscure treatment effects. In addition, although I 
have measured any systematic way of behaving by individual characteristics, some 
unobservable effects may be missing. Therefore, I have applied generalized panel random 
effect estimation (Wooldridge 2002; Davidson and MacKinnon 2004) and set subject-id 
as the cross-sectional or group variable. Subjects make choices 30 rounds for 3 
consecutive sections, 90 rounds in total. Therefore, the time variable for panel estimation 
is set 1 to 90. The dependent variable of the regression analysis if energy conservation, or 
the difference between regular energy bill ($2,000) and energy bill a subject pays after 
making energy saving choices. The estimations are undertaken using xtgls estimation in 
STATA release in 11. I have explained the dependent and independent variables in Table 
5 and 6, and have presented the estimation result of six different specifications in Table 7.  
I have found robust and consistent estimation inference that IGT and/or DGT 
increases energy conservation at 1% level of significance. Conservation of energy 
decreases as subjects get choice to purchase HI, at 5% or 10% significance level. The 
estimation result suggests subjects, who buy either Ins1 or Ins2, spend more on ESC. 
Similar to the non-parametric estimation results, there is no significant increase in energy 
conservation as MOD is in effect. Impact of initial energy conservation (energy 
conservation on period 1) of subjects is robust and increases energy conservation for the 
rest of the section at 1% significance level. Initial energy conservation of subjects 
represents the importance of energy saving innate nature of people (Kirman and Teschl 
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2010; Poortinga et al. 2004). Energy conservation seems to decrease as a subject 
progresses through the sections (Baseline to Treatment to Repeated baseline) at 1% level 
of significance. Hence, I conclude subjects decrease their expenditure on ESC through 
sections, as they learn the nature of the experiment. Energy conservation also increases as 
subjects move along a section, making repeated energy saving decisions over 30 rounds, 
at 1% significance level.  The estimation result suggests that energy conservation 
increases with environmental concern and decreases with concern for the society, at 1% 
to 3% level of significance. Most of the subject’s characteristics are not significant 
determinant of energy conservation. However, I found few incidents where energy 
conservation is less for female subjects than male subjects. Although not consistent in all 
six regression-specification, American Indian subjects save less energy and African 
American subjects save more energy at 1% to 3% level of significance in comparison to 
Hispanic subjects of the experiment. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The experimental design of this study incorporates major limitations to market 
success of energy saving residential installations into consideration. Subjects’ energy bill 
is set fifteenth part of their consumption expenditure and twenty-fifth part of their annual 
income, since one of the major limitations to market success of energy saving residential 
installations is the relative insignificance of energy costs to total expenditure. As energy 
efficiency gap is negligible, consumers may find energy saving residential installations 
not profit maximizing in presence of transaction costs of searching for and processing 
information. I have incorporated this concern, as ESCLT and ESCST are not beneficial in 
absence of health benefit.  
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The parametric and non-parametric estimation results a considerable number of 
findings. Firstly, there is no significant estimated energy saving benefit from MOD. 
Subjects may increase or decrease their energy saving expenditure in response to 
information. Environmental contribution of subjects may be substitute and negatively 
related (Andreoni 2006; Powell and Steinberg 2006; Kolm and Ythier 2006), or 
complementary and proportionate (Bardsley 2000; Croson 2007; Fischbacher et al. 2001) 
to contribution of others. Therefore, information may be advantageous, disadvantageous, 
or of no significance to energy saving, on the basis of its relative strength. Secondly, 
energy conservation decreases with option to buy health insurance. However, subjects 
reduce their energy consumption as they purchase either of Ins1 and Ins2. The result 
seems self-contradictory; but can be explained. The search leads us to implications of 
‘Moral Hazard’ and ‘Moral Imperative’. In the experimental design, HI policy and 
reduction in energy bill are perfect substitute, since both reduce expected medical 
expenditure (Laffont 1995). Therefore, energy saving effort of an average participant 
reduces with exposure to HI. On the contrary, as a subject purchase health insurance, a 
reverse principle originates inside his mind to act on environmental protection. The 
reverse principle is known as moral imperative (Postma and Smeyers 2012). Therefore 
two opposite forces, moral hazard and moral imperative, determine the ultimate influence 
of HI on energy saving. Moral imperative decreases with opportunity cost (Turaga et al. 
2010), and is weaker for Ins2 to Ins1. Thirdly, although I do not find enough evidence by 
the non-parametric estimation results, the parametric estimation result confirms both IGT 
and DGT policy interventions significantly increase energy saving. The estimation result 
  44
suggests DGT policy intervention saves more energy than IGT, since expected financial 
gain is better incentive than anticipated monetary loss (Levitt et al. 2012).  
There is specific reason why I advocate policy regulation on public benefit of 
energy conservation (i.e., Green Tax) and not private cost of electricity (i.e., voltage 
cost), promoting energy saving. James Androi (1990) has explained why people give to 
charity by proposing people receive utility from the act of giving, known as warm-glow 
giving. Energy-saving residential installations and behavioral practices save money on 
electricity consumption (private benefit) and decrease air-emission/air-pollution (public 
benefit). Therefore, ESCs contribute in environmental protection and also save money on 
energy. As per unit of voltage increases, ESCs become more profitable. However, their 
environmental contribution does not change. Contributions are higher when more people 
are benefitted in return, holding per-person benefit the constant (Goeree 2002). Public 
measure to support green electricity is indispensable (Memges et al. 2005) and although 
voluntary environmental contracts should not be expected to function as the exclusive 
tool of environmental policy, they provide a niche market for both existing electric 
utilities and new energy supply companies (Kotchen et al. 2001). As motivations for 
environmental contributions are poorly determined by rational self-interested behavior, 
energy saving should also be encouraged with policies that target public benefit. 
Public insurers such as Medicare and Medi-Cal have a lot to gain from cleaner air, 
so as employers and private insurers. Pollution-related health care costs drive up 
employees’ health insurance premiums and increases costs for the many employers who 
contribute to those premiums (Cutler 2002; Lawson and Nemec 2003). Workers may also 
pay directly for pollution, as higher insurance premiums translate into lower wages 
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(Chernew et al 1997; Olson 2002; Baicker and Chandra 2006). Insurers make lower 
profits if health insurance premiums do not increase as much as medical spending does 
due to dirty air, and vice versa. In short, everyone benefits from cleaner air (Romley et al. 
2010). Energy efficiency seems to be crowded out when subjects have the option to buy 
health insurance to cover pollution related health risks. Therefore an interdisciplinary 
policy is strongly recommended that translate energy saving into reduction in air 
pollution, and generates benefit in premiums and deductibles of health insurance policies.  
The study has certain limitations. Although there is enough evidence that most 
energy saving choices increase private benefit in the long run, I considered them non-
beneficial in absence of decrease in medical risk in the experimental set-up. It is not 
beyond argument, but justified since behavioral researches should explore interventions 
with the maximum potential environmental-impact rather than the greatest theoretical or 
experimental interest (Stern 2000). However, default knowledge of benefit from energy 
saving choices may partially influence decisions. Also, a particular section of the 
population (students) took part in the experimental sessions. Students may not be 
responsible family members to pay for electricity, medical bills, and other household 
expenditures. Therefore, confirming the results with household surveys will guide better 
policy designs.  
In future, this study might be elaborated to solve several other aspects of human 
behavior in energy use. We can study change in energy saving choices, as subjects 
monitor others’ decisions after a considerable number of rounds and not always. Any 
significant change in their choice would enrich scholarly studies on information limit. 
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Also, as we increase per unit cost of electricity instead of influencing the Green Tax, we 
can compare relative efficiency of private and public incentive on energy saving. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Medical Emergency, Allied Expenses, and Benefit from Reduction in Energy Bill 
Probability of Medical Emergency = P (Medical Emergency) = 0.60 
Probability of Negligible Medical Emergency  
= P (Negligible Medical Emergency/Medical Emergency)  
= P (Negligible Medical Emergency) x P (Medical Emergency) = 0.50x0.60 = 0.3 
Probability of Minor Medical Emergency  
= P (Minor Medical Emergency/Medical Emergency)  
= P (Minor Medical Emergency) x P (Medical Emergency) = 0.47x0.60 = 0.282 
Probability of Major Medical Emergency  
= P (Major Medical Emergency/Medical Emergency)  
= P (Major Medical Emergency) x P (Medical Emergency) = 0.03x0.60 = 0.018 
Mean medical expense of ‘Negligible Medical Emergency’ = $0 
Mean medical expense of ‘Minor Medical Emergency’ = $3,000 
Mean medical expense of ‘Major Medical Emergency’ = $35,000 
Expected medical expense of every participant/round 
= $(0 x 0.3 + 3,000 x 0.282 + 35,000 x 0.018)/round  
= $1,476 /round 
Decrease in $200 of total energy bill reduces Probability of Medical Emergency by 1%. 
Therefore, expected medical expense of every participant per round decreases by, 
($1,476/60) = $24.6. 
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Private and Social Benefits of ESCST and ESCLT 
Private and social benefits of ESCST: 
Private benefit of EEL (per round) = Reduction in energy bill = $60  
Social benefit of EEL (per round) = Reduction in energy bill + Reduction in group’s total 
expected medical expenses = $60 + (60/200) x $24.6 x 8 = $119.04 
Private benefit of ECB (per round) = Reduction in energy bill = $140  
Social benefit of ECB (per round) = Reduction in energy bill + Reduction in group’s total 
expected medical expenses = $140 + (140/200) x $24.2 x 8 = $277.76 
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Present value calculations of private and social benefits of ESCLT: 
(If Round = 1) 
Discount Rate = d = 1/(1+Rate of Interest) = 1/1.03  
A = (1-d30)/(1-d) = 20.19 
Discounted present value of private benefits of GHP = Discounted present value of 
reduction in energy bill = A x $200.00 = 20.19 x $200.00 = $4,038.00 
(approximated to two decimals) 
Discounted present value of social benefit of GHP (per round) = Reduction in energy bill 
+ Reduction in group’s total expected medical expenses = A{$200 + ($200/$200) 
x $24.6 x 8} = 20.19 x $396.80 = $8,011.39 (approximated to two decimals) 
Discounted present value of private benefits of RWT = Discounted present value of 
reduction in energy = A x $200.00 = 20.19 x $200.00 = $4,038.00 (approximated 
to two decimals) 
Discounted present value of social benefit of RWT (per round) = Reduction in energy bill 
+ Reduction in group’s total expected medical expenses = A{$200 + ($200/$200) 
x $24.6 x 8} = 20.19 x $396.8 = $8,011.39 (approximated to two decimals) 
Discounted present value of private benefits of RSES = Discounted present value of 
reduction in energy bill = A x $400 = 20.19 x $400.00 = $8,076.00 (approximated 
to two decimals) 
Discounted present value of social benefit of RSES (per round) = Reduction in energy 
bill + Reduction in group’s total expected medical expenses = A{$400 + 
($400/$200) x $24.6 x 8} = 20.19 x $793.6 = $16,022.78 (approximated to two 
decimals) 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Experimental design 
Part One Part Two Part Three 
The Holt and Laury risk-
aversion test 
Experiment with energy saving options 
Socio-demographic survey 
 
Baseline 
Treatment 
(IGT or DGT) 
 
Repeated Baseline 
10 Choices 30 Rounds 30 Rounds 30 Rounds 12 Responses 
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Table 2: Average energy saving by treatment 
Sessions  Baseline Treatment Repeated Baseline 
Experiment One: 
ESC 
IGT 762.38 (296.06) 
807.08 
(309.02) 
853.33 
(270.44) 
DGT 808.96 (277.49) 
845.50 
(234.50) 
773.79 
(317.29) 
Experiment Two: 
ESC + HI 
IGT 670.79 (334.96) 
654.08 
(324.63) 
572.50 
(387.96) 
DGT 812.83 (201.10) 
755.08 
(254.99) 
680.58 
(306.62) 
Experiment Three: 
ESC + MOD 
IGT 663.95 (277.44) 
659.17 
(281.05) 
645.06 
(317.52) 
DGT 815.29 (301.88) 
857.54 
(231.69) 
782.42 
(343.17) 
Experiment Four: 
ESC + HI + MOD 
IGT 712.92 (364.01) 
847.29 
(204.05) 
680.88 
(381.27) 
DGT 630.71 (244.38) 
681.54 
(235.08) 
534.96 
(305.31) 
Note: ESC represents ‘Energy saving Choices’, ESCLT represents ‘Long Term Energy Saving Choices’, ESCST represents ‘Short 
Term Energy Saving Choices’, HI represents ‘Health Insurance’, and MOD represents ‘Monitor Others’ Decision’ 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of decision variables for non-parametric estimation  
Variable Definition N Baseline Treatment Repeated Baseline 
GEOTHERMAL Period on which respondent chooses to invest in GHP (1 to 30), 31 otherwise  384 
5.81 
(9.47) 
6.40 
(10.16) 
8.11 
(11.40) 
WIND Period on which respondent chooses to invest in RWT (1 to 30), 31 otherwise  384 
9.20 
(11.62) 
8.45 
(11.35) 
9.90 
(11.16) 
SOLAR Period on which respondent chooses to invest in RSES (1 to 30), 31 otherwise  384 
7.05 
(10.46) 
4.97 
(8.43) 
8.71 
(11.86) 
LIGHT Number of time the participant chooses EEL in 30 rounds (0 to 30) 384 
17.14 
(10.46) 
17.04 
(11.56) 
16.45 
(12.40) 
APPLIANCE Number of time the participant chooses ECB in 30 rounds (0 to 30) 384 
18.97 
(10.71) 
18.75 
(11.44) 
18.13 
(12.30) 
EXPENDITURE Undiscounted total expenditure ($) on GHP, RWT, RSES, EEL, and ECB 384 
30,828.13 
(10,517.48) 
31,852.34 
(8,891.21) 
29,216.41 
(12,334.88) 
Note: Three observations (one for every section) for each of 128 participants 
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Table 4: Non-parametric test results  
 
Dummy Variable 
GEOTHERMAL WIND SOLAR LIGHT APPLIANCE EXPENDITURE 
RANK t-Test RANK t-Test RANK t-Test RANK t-Test RANK t-Test RANK t-Test 
IGT 
BSL 0.03 (0.98) 
-1.03 
(0.55) 
3.28*** 
(0.00) 
2.06 
(0.33) 
1.79* 
(0.07) 
2.53 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.93) 
-0.05 
(0.98) 
0.42 
(0.67) 
0.73 
(0.71) 
-1.22 
(0.22) 
-1779.69 
(0.35) 
RPBSL 0.45 (0.65) 
0.48 
(0.79) 
1.47 
(0.14) 
1.52 
(0.47) 
2.35** 
(0.02) 
3.48* 
(0.07) 
-0.85 
(0.40) 
0.06 
(0.98) 
-0.75 
(0.46) 
0.33 
(0.87) 
-2.42** 
(0.02) 
-2631.25 
(0.20) 
DGT 
BSL -0.34 (0.73) 
-0.14 
(0.94) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.55 
(0.78) 
2.86*** 
(0.00) 
1.63 
(0.29) 
0.18 
(0.86) 
0.25 
(0.90) 
-0.80 
(0.42) 
-0.30 
(0.88) 
-0.93 
(0.35) 
-268.75 
(0.86) 
RPBSL 1.48 (0.14) 
2.93 
(0.14) 
0.72 
(0.47) 
1.39 
(0.51) 
3.05*** 
(0.00) 
4.00** 
(0.02) 
-1.57 
(0.12) 
-1.25 
(0.56) 
-2.62*** 
(0.01) 
-1.56 
(0.47) 
-2.53** 
(0.01) 
-2640.63 
(0.14) 
HI 
WIMDO -2.02** (0.04) 
-4.51*** 
(0.00) 
-1.86* 
(0.06) 
-5.52*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.91) 
-2.05 
(0.15) 
3.91*** 
(0.00) 
6.64*** 
(0.00) 
2.98*** 
(0.00) 
5.46*** 
(0.00) 
4.22*** 
(0.00) 
5140.63*** 
(0.00) 
WOMDO -1.73* (0.08) 
-3.77* 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(0.79) 
-2.10 
(0.21) 
0.25 
(0.81) 
-2.33 
(0.15) 
5.15*** 
(0.00) 
8.09*** 
(0.00) 
4.16*** 
(0.00) 
6.66*** 
(0.00) 
4.86*** 
(0.00) 
5078.13*** 
(0.00) 
MDO 
WIHI -0.49 (0.62) 
-0.65 
(0.71) 
-1.71* 
(0.09) 
-2.95 
(0.11) 
-0.63 
(0.53) 
0.84 
(0.61) 
0.42 
(0.68) 
0.22 
(0.89) 
1.57 
(0.12) 
0.44 
(0.77) 
-0.12 
(0.90) 
-244.79 
(0.88) 
WOHI -0.25 (0.80) 
0.09 
(0.94) 
-0.15 
(0.88) 
0.47 
(0.75) 
-0.63 
(0.53) 
0.56 
(0.67) 
1.90* 
(0.06) 
1.68 
(0.27) 
-0.30 
(0.77) 
-0.76 
(0.65) 
1.66* 
(0.10) 
-307.29 
(0.82) 
Note: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are p-values 
The RANK-test represent the signed-rank or rank-sum test, as applicable. The null hypothesizes are as follows:  
H0 (BSL):   Dummy Variable (Baseline) = Dummy Variable (IGT/DGT)  
H0 (RPBSL):  Dummy Variable (Repeated Baseline) = Dummy Variable (IGT/DGT)  
H0 (WIMDO):  Dummy Variable (Without HI, with MDO) = Dummy Variable (With HI, with MDO)  
H0 (WOMDO):  Dummy Variable (Without HI, without MDO) = Dummy Variable (With HI, without MDO)  
H0 (WIHI):  Dummy Variable (With HI, without MDO) = Dummy Variable (With HI, with MDO)  
H0 (WOHI):  Dummy Variable (Without HI, without MDO) = Dummy Variable (Without HI, with MDO) 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of risk-aversion and socio-demographic responses 
Variable Description N M SD 
AVERSION Holt and Laury risk-aversion index (1 to 9) 128 6.70 2.13 
AGE Age of the respondent 128 25.82 4.34 
FEMALE 1 if Female; 0 otherwise 128 0.48 0.50 
WHITE 1 if White; 0 otherwise 128 0.19 0.39 
BLACK 1 if African-American; 0 otherwise 128 0.08 0.27 
ASIAN 1 if Asian, 0 otherwise 128 0.41 0.49 
AMEIND 1 if American Indian or Alaska Native; 0 otherwise 128 0.01 0.09 
LIBERAL 
Political orientation of respondent (0 = 
Extremely liberal, 1 = Liberal, 2 = Slightly 
Liberal, 3 = Middle of the road, 4 = Slightly 
conservative, 5 = Conservative, 6=Very 
conservative) 
128 2.41 1.49 
REPUBLIC 1 if Republican; 0 otherwise 128 0.09 0.28 
INDEPENDENT 1 if Independent; 0 otherwise 128 0.55 0.50 
ECONOMICS 1 if majoring in Economics; 0 otherwise 128 0.10 0.30 
SOCIAL 1 if majoring in Social Science (other than Economics); 0 otherwise 128 0.09 0.29 
MATH 1 if majoring in Math, Statistics, Computer Science or Engineering; 0 otherwise 128 0.17 0.38 
NATURAL 1 if majoring in Natural Science; 0 otherwise 128 0.30 0.46 
BUSINESS 1 if majoring in Business; 0 otherwise 128 0.03 0.17 
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ARTS 1 if majoring in Arts, Language etc; 0 otherwise 128 0.07 0.26 
OTHER 1 if majoring in other subjects; 0 otherwise 128 0.23 0.42 
SCHOOL 
School round (0 = Freshman, 1 = 
Sophomore, 2 = Junior, 3 = Senior, 4 = 
Graduate Student) 
128 3.28 1.03 
HEALTH 
How strongly the respondent believes that 
environmental pollution causes health issues 
(0 to 4; 0 = Really believe so, 4 = Do not 
believe so, at all) 
128 0.22 0.50 
ENERGY 
How strongly the respondent believes that 
conservation of energy saves the 
environment? 
(0 to 4; 0 = Really believe so, 4 = Do not 
believe so, at all) 
128 0.43 0.77 
ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental concern of respondent: (0 to 
4; 0 = Really believe so, 4 = Do not believe 
so, at all) 
128 0.57 0.76 
SOCIETY 
Concern for other people/society: 
(0 to 4; 0= Very concerned, 4 = Not at all 
concerned) 
128 0.55 0.86 
Notes: Male (MALE), Hispanic (HISPANIC), Democrat (DEMOCRAT), and major in 
arts, language (ARTS) are dropped to avoid multicollinearity problem, and we drop 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (PACISLAN) due to no observation. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of experimental data 
Variable Definition N M SD 
CONSERVATION Energy saving ($2,000 – Household energy bill) 11,520 729.53 309.35 
INICONSER Conservation of energy (ROUND = 1) 11,520 429.01 292.84 
SECTION Section index (1 to 3) 11,520 2 0.82 
ROUND Round index (1 to 30) 11,520 15.50 8.66 
TIME (t) tth decision of participant (1 to 90, 30 rounds per section) 11,520 45.50 25.98 
INFORMATION 1 if participant receives the information of others’ choices; 0 otherwise 11,520 0.50 0.50 
INSOPT 1 if HI is available; 0 otherwise 11,520 0.50 0.50 
INSONE 1 if Ins1 is chosen; 0 if Ins1 is not chosen 11,520 0.12 0.33 
INSTWO 1 if Ins2 is chosen; 0 if Ins2 is not chosen 11,520 0.26 0.44 
INCREASE 1 for treatments of IGT, 0 otherwise 11,520 0.17 0.37 
DECREASE 1 for treatments of DGT, 0 otherwise 11,520 0.17 0.37 
Note: 90 observations for each of 128 participants (11,520 = 90 x 128)
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Table 7: Regression result (Dependent variable, CONSERVATION) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CONSERVATION CONSERVATION CONSERVATION CONSERVATION CONSERVATION CONSERVATION
INICONSER 0.363*** 0.364*** 0.363*** 0.365*** 0.364*** 0.363*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
       
INCREASE 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (4.526) (4.527) (4.526) (4.526) (4.526) (4.526) 
       
DECREASE 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (4.476) (4.477) (4.476) (4.476) (4.476) (4.476) 
       
INSOPT -0.177*** -0.172*** -0.175*** -0.173*** -0.169*** -0.155*** 
 (39.10) (38.67) (38.58) (35.10) (37.23) (37.00) 
       
INSONE 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (7.615) (7.617) (7.615) (7.614) (7.615) (7.614) 
       
INSTWO 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 
 (7.809) (7.810) (7.809) (7.805) (7.808) (7.808) 
       
INFORMATION -0.053 -0.044 -0.053 -0.024 -0.042 -0.038 
 (36.81) (36.20) (36.44) (34.60) (35.51) (35.24) 
       
ROUND 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
       
SECTION -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 
 (1.834) (1.834) (1.834) (1.834) (1.834) (1.834) 
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AVERSION 0.006 -0.001  0.019   
 (8.785) (8.605)  (7.999)   
       
AGE 0.036 0.012   0.026 0.032 
 (3.486) (3.535)   (2.993) (2.994) 
       
FEMALE -0.009 -0.138** -0.010 -0.127*** 0.005  
 (35.02) (33.29) (34.56) (23.84) (32.81)  
       
WHITE 0.014 0.023 0.005 0.013 0.001 -0.000 
 (36.29) (32.29) (34.37) (26.31) (31.26) (31.15) 
       
BLACK 0.043 0.073** 0.046 0.062*** 0.049* 0.045* 
 (33.54) (37.53) (33.19) (26.99) (31.47) (31.54) 
       
ASIAN -0.021 -0.095 0.001 -0.040 -0.018 -0.031 
 (38.92) (41.41) (33.85) (23.97) (37.59) (37.97) 
       
AMEIND -0.097* -0.088 -0.097* -0.097* -0.100* -0.107* 
 (204.6) (201.4) (201.8) (193.6) (198.2) (198.4) 
       
POLITICAL 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.014   
 (11.93) (11.08) (11.63) (10.30)   
       
REPUBLICAN 0.053 0.041 0.042    
 (74.41) (72.43) (71.35)    
       
INDEPENDENT 0.016 -0.031 -0.002    
 (29.70) (29.95) (25.63)    
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SCHOOL 0.008 0.021 0.030  0.010 0.014 
 (20.50) (19.83) (18.24)  (19.14) (19.09) 
       
ECONOMICS -0.075 -0.015 -0.068  -0.065 -0.031 
 (111.8) (111.6) (109.9)  (104.4) (107.4) 
       
SOCIAL 0.002 0.019 0.017  0.011 0.027 
 (117.1) (115.5) (113.5)  (112.2) (112.3) 
       
MATH -0.051 0.033 -0.049  -0.041 -0.030 
 (111.6) (110.5) (109.7)  (107.3) (106.7) 
       
NATURAL -0.004 0.076 0.011  0.007 0.014 
 (104.7) (103.5) (102.4)  (99.87) (99.01) 
       
BUSINESS -0.075 -0.017 -0.074  -0.072 -0.071 
 (119.3) (118.2) (117.9)  (116.5) (115.5) 
       
OTHER -0.074 0.027 -0.053  -0.066 -0.065 
 (106.3) (106.2) (103.0)  (102.5) (101.6) 
       
HEALTH -0.011  -0.014 0.023 0.001 0.006 
 (27.45)  (27.08) (17.68) (22.08) (17.85) 
       
ENVIRONMENT 0.091*  0.093**  0.092** 0.126*** 
 (19.25)  (18.98)  (18.32) (16.93) 
       
ENERGY  0.049    -0.081 
  (21.29)    (25.95) 
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SOCIETY  -0.106**  -0.075*   
  (17.75)  (14.14)   
       
Observations 11520 11520 11520 11520 11520 11520 
R2 (Overall) 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 
Note: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors.
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Figure 9: Energy saving choices during Experiment One and Experiment Three (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The screenshot shows that it is the 2nd of 30 rounds. The subject has decided to invest in Solar Energy System this round. He 
also makes one short-term choice in the same round: Energy Efficient Lighting. Since the subject has already invested in 
Residential Wind Turbine in a previous round, it is grayed out. Once the subject chooses his desired investments, he clicks the 
“OK” button to find out the results of the round and move on to the next round.
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Figure 10: No medical expense during Experiment One (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The subject has spent $15,100 on ESCST and ESCLT. His electricity bill for the 2nd round is $1,340 and has also paid a Green 
Tax of $300. He has an interest earning of $2,809 and his new savings account balance is $96,426. He pays no medical expense. 
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Figure 11: Minor medical expense during Experiment One (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The subject has spent $15,100 on ESCST and ESCLT. His electricity bill for the 2nd round is $1,340 and has also paid a Green 
Tax of $300. He has an interest earning of $2,809 and his new savings account balance is $92,224. He pays a minor medical 
expense of $4,202. 
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Figure 12: Major medical expense during Experiment One  (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The subject has not spent any money on ESCST and ESCLT. His electricity bill for the 15th round is $1,400 and has also paid 
a Green Tax of $300. He has an interest earning of $4,199 and his new savings account balance is $130,651. He pays a major 
medical expense of $13,499.
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Figure 13: Energy saving choices during Experiment One and Experiment Three (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The screenshot shows that it is the 2nd of 30 rounds. The subject has decided to invest in Solar Energy System this 
round. He also makes one short-term choice in the same round: Energy Efficient Lighting. Since the subject has already 
invested in Residential Wind Turbine in a previous round, it is grayed out. He has also selected the “$1,300 premium and 10% 
co-pay with a $5,000 cap” insurance policy. Once the subject chooses his desired investments, he clicks the “OK” button to 
find out the results of the round and move on to the next round.
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Figure 14: Minor medical expense during Experiment Three (Screenshot) 
 
Note: The subject has spent $200 on ESCST and ESCLT in total. His electricity bill for the 4th round is $1,460 and has also paid 
a Green Tax of $300. He has an interest earning of $3,739 and his new savings account balance is $126,127. He pays a minor 
medical expense of $2,256. It can be seen that among the 8 subjects, 2 have installed GHP, 8 have installed RWT, and 5 have 
installed RSES. For ESCST, 2 of the subjects have chosen EEL and 3 have selected ECB for that particular round.
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CHAPTER III:  
UNDERSTANDING HOUSEHOLD PREFERENCES FOR HURRICANE RISK 
MITIGATION INFORMATION: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY RESPONSES 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Catastrophic losses caused by hurricane related hazards have led to increasing calls 
for a shift in mitigation behavior. It is clearly evident that investment in natural hazard 
mitigation activities is highly efficient from the viewpoint of economic returns. For 
instance, the Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) report shows that each dollar spent 
in hazard mitigation provides a return of $4 in terms of future net benefits to the society 
(Lindell and Prater 2000; Merrell et al. 2005). Public agencies are experimenting in 
designing innovative programs to encourage homeowners to adopt mitigation measures 
against coastal hazards risks. Better information about hurricane risk mitigation status 
(HRMS) of residential structures can motivate homeowners to undertake mitigation 
measures and to become effective stewards in developing resilient coastal communities 
(Thieken 2006; Siegrist and Gutscher 2008; Ge 2011). 
 Risk information is essential in informing the population living in hurricane prone 
areas (Crowther 2007). However, in many cases information is not easily available and 
households may have different preferences for seeking risk information (Englehardt 
2002; Yokota and Thompson 2004; Weber and Siebenmorgen 2005). Being exposed to 
hurricane threats, people face difficult choices to make. Effective risk communication is 
at the heart of making efficient choices and the significance of effective hurricane risk 
communication is drawing more attention (National Science Board Report 2007). Social 
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science research can elicit useful information to facilitate better risk communication to 
enable stakeholders make optimal choices. Communicating risk information to 
stakeholders can help the society efficiently organize risk-averting behavior (Mozumder 
et al. 2008). 
 For example, information regarding a residential structure’s capacity to stand 
against hurricanes of different strength can affect mitigation choices in different ways 
(Santella et al. 2010). A host of other factors e.g., available resources, financial incentives 
for mitigation measures, physical location, and a variety of household characteristics 
(e.g., risk perception, past exposure (Khan and Suaris 1994), education (Lindell and 
Hwang 2008), number of children (Trumbo 2011) and elderly people at home, insurance 
status and structural characteristics of the living place) may influence the demand for risk 
information that eventually affect mitigation behavior. Against this backdrop, I examine 
survey responses in relation to a novel program; My Safe Florida Home (MSFH) that is 
designed to encourage residents to adopt mitigation measures to reduced damages caused 
by hurricane and other windstorms.10 
 An important policy question is how people respond to these types of programs 
developed to provide risk information and promote mitigation. Who are likely to respond 
more based on the implicit and explicit cost and benefit they face? Since risk information 
is critical in adopting mitigation measures, I analyze household willingness to allow a 
state-certified inspector to evaluate the hurricane risk mitigation status (HRMS) of the 
                                                        
10 The State of Florida has recently initiated the My Safe Florida Home (MSFH) program 
which provides a free inspection to evaluate the hurricane risk mitigation status (HRMS) 
of residential structure and a matching grant (up to $5000) for retrofitting suggested by a 
State certified inspector (visit http://www.mysafefloridahome.com for further details 
about this program). 
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residential structure they live in (a core component of the MSFH program). I identify 
major drivers of household preference for this pertinent risk information. I expect insights 
from this analysis may provide helpful inputs in designing efficient and cost-effective 
public policy to influence household’s mitigation behavior in a desired direction. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Kunreuther et al. (2004) highlighted the need for research that focus on what type 
of information is effective to stakeholders to ensure the optimal level of investment in 
risk mitigation measures. They also report evidence that individuals often tend to under-
invest in self-protective mitigation measures when such measures are cost-effective but 
over-invest when they are ineffective. Variety of evidence suggests that people fail to 
recognize or act well against low probability, high-consequence events such as hurricanes 
even though it is against the prediction made by the expected utility theory. Information 
plays a crucial role in explaining this type of behavior since critical information in 
establishing the link between risk perception and risk mitigation behavior is often 
missing. 
 Information provision is emerging as a common policy tool in environmental risk 
management (Petrakis et al. 2005; Tietenberg and Wheeler 2001). Better risk information 
can have efficiency-enhancing impacts in a variety of natural resource management 
contexts (Costello et al. 1998; Bontems and Thomas 2000). Communicating risk 
information to stakeholders in natural hazard mitigation planning can also increase total 
mitigation efforts and help set priority for further policy intervention. However, the 
targeted audience of natural hazard mitigation policy is not a simple homogeneous group 
to comply with public policy programs of hazard mitigation. Rather there exists 
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considerable extent of heterogeneity in terms of risk perception, ability to respond and 
some other salient factors (Wilson et al. 2002). 
 In documenting heterogeneity of behavior related to hurricane related hazards, for 
instance, Peacock et al. conducted a survey to explore how various factors affect 
hurricane risk perceptions of single-family homeowners in Florida (Peacock et al. 2005). 
Findings (conducted on 1260 households residing in single-family owner occupied 
detached homes) indicate that experience, knowledge about the hurricanes and location of 
the home significantly affect hurricane risk perception. In another study, Peacock (2003) 
reported survey findings (a phone survey on 1533 homeowners) of single-family 
homeowners to assess hurricane mitigation status and found that year of residency and 
income had a positive effect but ethnicity (black) had a negative effect on adopting 
hurricane mitigation measures (e.g., shutter usage, envelope coverage). 
 Smith et al. (2006) investigated the role of ethnic, demographic and economic 
factors in coping with damages caused by a hurricane in Miami and found that income 
played a major role in the post disaster adjustment process more than other factors (e.g., 
ethnicity). Depending on income people either moved out or built their homes stronger 
and bought insurance to reduce the damage. Simmons et al. (2002) used data from 
Multiple Listing Service to investigate the role of self-insurance and self-protective 
mitigation measures in preventing damages from hurricanes on the resale value of single-
family homes. They found that the structural integrity index (SII) composed of 
topographical location, structural characteristics and architectural features were positively 
correlated with the resale value of single-family homes. 
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 Prater and Lindell (2000) focus on political aspects of adopting mitigation measures 
and conclude that ex-ante natural hazard mitigation programs are not very popular 
political agenda due to their long-term uncertain benefits. Investing funds in education, 
crime reduction, urbanization etc. that generate direct benefits are considered politically 
more rewarding compared to promoting mitigation. Despite the State of Florida has 
recently initiated a novel and innovative program (My Safe Florida Home, MSFH), 
which is designed to encourage residents to adopt mitigation measures and reduce 
damages caused by hurricane related hazards. 
 The State of Florida Legislature created the MSFH program in 2006 through the 
enactment of Section 215.5586, Florida Statutes (My Safe Florida Home 2008a). The 
program is designed to offer low-income homeowners the opportunity to strengthen and 
retrofit their homes against coastal hazards. The MSFA program works in collaboration 
with local governments and a volunteer organization to offer free home inspection to 
eligible homeowners (Volunteer Florida Foundation 2008). The program established by 
the Department of Financial Services (DFS) will end on June 30, 2009.11 There are 
certain eligibility criteria to participate in the program. A Florida resident, who owns a 
detached single-family home with an insured value of $500,000 or less and built prior to 
March 1, 2002, is eligible for free inspection. If a homeowner is not eligible for the 
program, he/she can pay a cost ($150) to get the home inspection done. The inspection 
report documents the steps that are essential to increase the resistance of a home against 
                                                        
11 A total of $250 million fund is allocated to provide at least 400,000 inspections and 
35,000 grants.(32) Based on the data collected from the public records of the My Safe 
Florida Home program (by April 2008), 65,536 applicants completed home inspections 
and 20,699 was approved (with a 31.6 % approval rate) for receiving grant assistance for 
mitigation. 
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hurricane damage, explaining and prioritizing seven home retrofits. The inspector also 
provides the estimated cost for improvements and potential insurance discounts available 
for those home improvements (My Safe Florida Home 2008). 
 Different types of benefits are attached to the home inspection report. First, eligible 
applicants with home inspections approved by the DFS can apply for a matching grant up 
to $5,000 to cover the expenses for specific mitigation measures. To be eligible for the 
grant, the inspections need to be conducted by an inspector certified by the DFS. 
Approved residents are provided with one year of time to complete the recommended 
improvements. There are seven specific categories of hurricane damage mitigation 
improvements, which are covered by this program. These include upgrading the strength 
of roof deck attachment, installation of the secondary roof water barrier, improvement in 
the roof covering from the wind damage, bracing gable end walls, reinforcement of roof-
to-wall, installation storm shutters to protect window openings and increasing the 
strength of the exterior doors. Second, homeowners may qualify for insurance discounts. 
The mitigation form approved by the certified MSFH inspector sent along with the 
inspection report can be used as a proof of specific mitigation measures adopted to 
qualify for insurance discounts. Discounts vary depending on the criteria set by the 
insurance companies and improvements made.12 
 Certain restrictions apply to participate in the program. Reimbursement of expenses 
also depends on homeowner’s income. The grant reimbursement is 100% of the actual 
                                                        
12 DFS has also recently developed a no interest loan program to encourage that involve 
private lending agencies in providing loans to homeowners of site-built property to cover 
the cost of mitigation measures. The loan is up to $5,000 for three years to homeowners 
and DFS will pay the market rate interest on the loan. 
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costs (not more than $5000) if applicant is a low-income homeowner (80% or less than 
average household income of the county) and 50% if non-low income homeowner. A 
valid homestead exemption (authorized by the local property appraiser’s office) is 
required to be eligible for receiving the grant money.13 The information provided in the 
application for grant and in the inspection report both are considered as public records 
and can be disclosed to insurance carriers and others. 
Against this backdrop, no prior study in coastal hazard mitigation context 
investigates household’s preference for risk information regarding hurricane risk 
mitigation status (HRMS) of the residential structure they live in. To fill this gap, I 
develop an analytical framework for analyzing household response in receiving this type 
of pertinent risk information. The analytical framework is used to motivate an empirical 
analysis based on a household survey. Using both single equation (probit) and joint 
equation (bivariate probit) probability models, I investigate the factors that affect 
household demand for information regarding hurricane risk mitigation status (HRMS). 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 I have used a utility-theoretic framework to gain insights on household willingness 
to allow a state-certified inspector to provide information about the hurricane risk 
mitigation status (HRMS) of their homes. Using a flexible random utility model (RUM), 
I investigate households’ preference for hurricane risk mitigation information. Self-
protective mitigation behavior of households’, is a multi-dimensional decision variable.  
                                                        
13  In Florida, the homestead exemption proof in each county is given by the local 
property appraiser’s office each year, which shows an exemption of at least $25,000 of 
appraised home value for property tax (see www.mysafefloridahome.com for further 
details). 
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 To begin with, let the indirect utility function of a household, living in a coastal 
hazard prone area, is written as follows. 
( )FHRMSIU ,,        (1) 
That is, utility of a family is considered to be a function of family income (I), desire and 
initiative to seek hurricane risk information through MSFH inspection (HRMS), and a set 
of socio-demographic characteristics (F). As in the study, households are asked whether 
they will like to have a free inspection, or not, under the MSFH program; HRMS is 
treated as a dichotomous variable. Households can either aware of their hurricane risk 
mitigation status (HRMS = 1) through opting for a free house inspection, or may not 
(HRMS = 0).  
 A household is supposed to avoid such an inspection, if and only if the opportunity 
cost of inspection, CI, is offsetting enough. That is, a household intends to avoid the 
MSFH inspection if the following condition satisfies. 
 ( ) ( )FHRMSCIIUFHRMSIU ,1,,0, =−>=     (2) 
Vice versa, the household will apply for the free MSFH inspection, if  
( ) ( )FHRMSCIIUFHRMSIU ,1,,0, =−<=     (3) 
As hurricane-strike on a residential structure is an uncertain incident, utility levels of 
households’ correspond to both a deterministic (V ), and a stochastic component (ε ). 
That is, 
ε+= VU         (4) 
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 Due to potential protection measures, stochastic component of utility differs with 
and without risk information, and therefore with an MSFH inspection. If we suppose that 
the indirect utility function of the household is linear in nature, the utility level of the 
household in concern can be represented as following.14 
   ( )

=++−
=++
=
1
0
111
000
HRMSifFCII
HRMSifFI
U
εγδ
εγδ
    (5) 
In the expression above, δ and γ  have been used to represent the coefficients15 of 
earnings to be spend, and characteristics of a households, respectively. Therefore, 
probability that a household asks for an inspection can be expressed as follows. 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
[ ] ( )mEmP
FCIIP
FHRMSIUFHRMSCIIUHRMSP
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−>−+−−=
=>=−==
1001101
,0,,1,1
εεγγδδδ   (6) 
In the expression above ( ) ( ) mFCII =−+−− 01101 γγδδδ , and E=− 10 εε . 
We suppose that E  is independently and identically distributed (iid), and Φ  is a standard 
normal cumulative density function (CDF). The above model outlined is capable of 
empirically analyze the choices made by households, whether to allow (or not to) the 
home inspection under MSFH, and obtain HRMS. As the home inspection is provided 
free for eligible residents, the cost of the inspection (CI) implies the overall opportunity 
cost of allowing the inspection. A household never asks for the inspection, if it does not 
increase the utility level. That is, if the household already knows the risk information or 
the disutility caused by the inspection exceeds the gain in utility from knowing the risk 
                                                        
14 We have used  when HRMS=0, and  when HRMS=1. 
15  and  are specific to household’s preference for inspection, and therefore are 
subscribed with preference status of the concerned household with MSFH inspection. 
ε = ε0 ε = ε1
δ γ
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information, the household rationally chooses not to opt for the MSFH inspection. I have 
analyzed the above, based on a household survey explained in the next section. 
4. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The International Hurricane Research Center at the Florida International University 
(Miami, Florida) conducts an annual survey to gather information in relation to Florida 
residents’ hurricane preparedness, each year at the beginning of the hurricane season. In 
2007, they conducted a phone survey (July 7-15, 2007), and asked respondents a number 
of questions concerning the My Safe Florida Home (MSFH) program. Using a random 
sample of registered voters living in Florida, the phone survey produced a total of 800 
complete adult household responses. Along with a host of socio-demographic 
information, the survey asked for households’ preference for hurricane preparedness, and 
mitigation responses.  
 The responses have been summarized in Table 8, when Table 9 explains questions 
asked to particular responses. It is evident from Table 9 that thirty percent of the 
respondents live in an evacuation zone. Eighty eight percent respondents have insurance 
to protect from damages to the residential structure they live in, and six percent of the 
households live in a manufactured or mobile home. In the complete sample, almost fifty 
six percent respondents feel extremely, or somewhat vulnerable, that they may suffer 
from damages caused by hurricane related hazards. Forty percent respondents report that 
household members in their family have been living in a physically damaged home 
caused by hurricane related hazards. As observed in Table 8, ninety six percent of the 
respondents have experience with tropical storms or hurricanes, where more than fifty six 
percent had either major or moderate damages, and eighty percent have suffered wind 
  84
related damages (e.g., wind debris breaking doors, windows and wind damaging the 
roof). 
 More than fifty percent respondents are aware of different types of discounts on 
adoption of hurricane risk mitigation measures (e.g., using window shutters, reinforcing 
roof by improved bracing and sheathing, reinforcing garage doors etc.). In a serious 
hurricane situation, eighty five percent of the respondents report that they have a plan to 
act. Around fifty eight percent respondents are quite certain that they have all necessary 
information to protect their lives and homes from hurricane related damages. Of 
particular interest for this analysis, more than sixty seven percent respondents confer 
positive respond that they will allow a state-certified inspector into their home to evaluate 
the hurricane risk mitigation status (HRMS) for free. Although, only twenty nine percent 
of the respondents are aware of free home inspections and monetary assistance under the 
MSFH program. 
Thirty nine percent of the respondents are male, and average size of the household 
is 3.19. Fifty five percent respondents have children (under 12 years), and/or senior 
citizen (above 65 years) living in the house. The annual income of the median respondent 
falls in the band of 50-75 thousands. By education, the median respondent is a college 
graduate. Now, let us discuss the estimation method in the next section. 
5. EMRIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 In studies of social science, as economics, probit model is popular as regression 
analysis for modeling categorical dependent variables. Therefore, the first analyzing tool 
I have used is the probit estimation technique. The suitability of probit model can be 
explained in application of the latent variable U . Often in social sciences, the dependent 
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variable (U ) is continuous in nature, but not observable. Instead, it results determining 
the outcome that is evident (Inspection = 0 or 1).16 As explained in equation (3), different 
utility levels corresponding to the decision of the respondent whether to allow a MSFH 
inspection or not, therefore determines the value of the outcome or the dependent variable 
(Inspection). 
 In the probit estimation, I suppose that U  follows a standard normal distribution. In 
general term, the probit estimation model is of the following form. 
εβ ++ XU        (7) 
X and β  represent vectors of independent and socio-demographic variables of respective 
household, and corresponding coefficients. Assuming random sampling, probit 
estimation method maximizes the following likelihood function ( L ). 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] Φ−−+Φ= UInspectionUInspectionL 1ln1ln   (8) 
 I, though, suspect the issue of selectivity bias due to non-random distribution of 
some explanatory variables across the sample, awareness of the MSFH program (Aware) 
and perception of vulnerability to hurricanes (Vulnerable). There are individual and 
household level unobserved factors, and being aware about the MSFH program or feeling 
vulnerable to hurricane damages can result choice of MSFH inspection, as they are two 
interrelated decisions of a single respondent. The other estimation method, I have 
applied, is therefore the bivariate probit approach that addresses selectivity bias with two 
of the explanatory variables, Aware and Vulnerable.17 The bivariate probit model is a 
                                                        
16 Please see Hausman and Wise (1978) and Cohen (2003) for details. 
 
17 Please see Staton (2006) for detailed application of bivariate probit approach. 
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joint estimation technique; where probability of allowing a MSFH inspection (Inspection) 
to evaluate hurricane mitigation status and, probability of being aware of the MSFH 
program (Aware) or feeling vulnerable of Hurricane damages (Vulnerable), are estimated 
together.  
 Explaining the estimation technique, let Y  is another latent variable for Aware or 
Vulnerable. Then, 
εβ += XU        (9) 
 ηα += ZY         (10) 
X and Z , again, represent vectors of independent and socio-demographic variables of 
respective household and corresponding coefficients, in relation to being aware of the 
MSFH program or feeling vulnerable from hurricane damages. The corresponding 
coefficients are β andα . Following Greene (1998, 2003), the errors ε  and η  follow a 
bivariate normal distribution (BVN) with mean zero variance one. The correlation 
coefficient ( ρ ) between the error terms is not zero, or ( )ηερ ,cov= . 
6. RESULT 
 In Table 10, probit probability models show that the coefficient of Insurance is 
positive and highly significant (at 1% levels in Models 1 to 4). That is if the respondent 
carries an insurance to protect damages to the residential structure (Insurance), he/she is 
more willing to allow home inspection (in all four models in Table 10). The finding 
indicates that households who have insurance see a higher incentive to obtain the risk 
information as they can use the inspection report to claim insurance rebates from their 
insurance companies. Next, the coefficient of Damage is positive and significant at 1% 
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levels in all four models. This implies that experience with physical damages to home, 
from hurricane related hazards in the past, significantly increases the probability of 
allowing a home inspection. In consistence to earlier studies, the probability of allowing a 
home inspection is expected to increase with perception of vulnerability to hurricane 
damages (Vulnerability) at 5% level of significance (Models 1-4, Table 10). For instance, 
Mozumder et al. (2008) found that higher perception of risk leads to a higher demand for 
risk information related to wildfires in an urban wild-land interface. Alongside, prior 
experience (Exposure) with a hurricane or a tropical storm (not necessarily experienced 
physical damages) is also seen to be positively associated with the higher probability of 
allowing inspection (the coefficient of Exposure is positive and significant at 5% levels in 
Models 1 to 4). 
 Different household characteristics are also found to affect the willingness to allow 
a home inspection. Households with more members are less likely to allow a home 
inspection since the coefficient of Members is negative and significant (at 1% and 5% 
levels) in three out of four models (Models 2, 3 and 4). Households with more members 
face a higher opportunity cost to allow the inspection, as it will require more adjustments 
to be made in their usual lifestyle.18 The coefficient of Income is not statistically 
significant in any of the two models (Model 2 and 3). The negative sign of its coefficient 
(robust in all two models) imply that households with lower income may utilize the 
opportunity of free home inspection. The coefficient of Education is also negative and 
                                                        
18 This is also consistent with the negative coefficient of the variable Dependent in Model 
4 (though not statistically significant). Dependent is a dummy variable, which controls 
for children (under 12 years) and/or seniors (above 65 years) living in the household. 
These households also may face a disproportionately higher opportunity cost in making 
adjustments to allow a home inspection. 
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significant (Model 1 and 4) indicating that highly educated households (who are often 
high income earners) are less likely to respond this program. These findings provide 
some evidence of the program’s effectiveness since MSFH program is designed to help 
low income households to adopt hurricane risk mitigation measures (Florida Association 
of Insurance Agents 2007). Regarding other control variables, the coefficient of Plan 
(Model 2, 3, and 4) and Evacuation (Model 4) are positive but not statistically significant. 
Households living in evacuation zones are tied up with a higher level of location-specific 
costal hazard risk (because of the danger of storm surge) may feel a higher need of the 
risk information. Households who have a plan to act on as the hurricane approaches may 
also feel a higher need of risk information as it helps to take ex-ante mitigation measures 
to reduce the risk. However, the coefficient of Information is negative (not statistically 
significant in Model 3 and 4) may imply that this group of households may be well 
informed of HRMS and so may be less willing to allow inspection. 
 The sign of the coefficient of Mobilehome is negative and significant at 5% level, 
implying residents, living in a manufactured or mobile home, are less willing to allow a 
home inspection (Models 1, 2, 3, and 4). Households living in mobile or manufactured 
homes may be well aware that these residential structures are highly prone to hurricane 
winds and may not want to receive a further confirmation through an additional piece of 
risk information. The coefficient of Aware is not significant and is also inconsistent in 
terms of its sign (Models 2, 3, and 4). Based on these probit estimates, thus it may imply 
that awareness about the MSFH program does not systematically affect the household’s 
willingness to allow a home inspection. 
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 The MSFH program awareness may be prone to selectivity bias leading to biased 
probability estimates in probit models reported in Table 3. Selectivity bias may arise as a 
consequence of non-random distribution of awareness regarding MSFH program. In 
Table 12, I have reported the estimated probability of allowing a free home inspection 
using bivariate probit models which allows awareness regarding MSFH program (Aware) 
to be explained by a host of factors in a separate equation. Table 12 shows the estimated 
probability of being aware of My Safe Florida Home (MSFH) program. The coefficient 
of Insurance is positive and significant in all four models. The coefficient of Damage is 
positive, but insignificant (in Model 5 and 8). Households who consider that they are 
certain that they have all necessary information are more likely to be aware of the MSFH 
program since the coefficient of Information is positive and significant at 5% level (in 
Models 5, 7 and 8). Households that live in a mobile or manufactured home are more 
likely to be aware of the MSFH program (the coefficient of Mobilehome is positive and 
significant at 10% significance level in Model 8).  Regarding other control variables, 
household size (Members) is negatively associated with awareness of MSFH program 
(Models 7). 
 Table 12 also documents the factors that significantly affect the probability of 
allowing a home inspection to obtain HRMS inspection. In consistence with the probit 
model estimation results, households carrying insurance (Insurance) are more likely to 
allow a free inspection. Households can realize the potential benefit of the HRMS 
inspection report to claim insurance discounts. Consistent with probit models, the 
coefficient of Damage is positive and highly significant (at 1% levels in Models 5, 6, 7, 
and 8) indicating that households, who suffered physical damages in the past, are more 
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likely to allow inspection. A higher perception of vulnerability to hurricane induced 
damages also leads to increase the willingness to allow a home inspection since the 
coefficient of Vulnerability is positive and significant (at 5% levels in Models 5 to 8, 
Table 12) implying that the perception of vulnerability to damages by hurricane related 
hazards leads to increased probability of allowing a home inspection. The coefficient of 
Exposure is also positive and significant (at 5% levels, Models 5 to 8). That is, prior 
experience with a tropical storm and/or a hurricane positively affects the probability of 
allowing a home inspection. The coefficient of Residency is negative and significant (at 
5% levels in Models 5 to 8). The finding implies that the number of years a household 
living in Florida (as a permanent resident) negatively affects the probability of allowing 
inspection. Mozumder et al. (2008) also find that households lived longer in a hazard 
prone area are less willing to positively respond to seek hazard related risk information. 
 Regarding household-specific characteristics, the coefficient of Income is negative 
and insignificant (in Models 6 and 7). As seen before (in Table 10), household size 
negatively affects the probability of allowing inspection since the coefficient of Members 
is negative and significant in Models 6, 7 and 8. The coefficient of Mobilehome is also 
negative and significant (at 5% levels in Models 5 to 8) implying that households living 
in a mobile or manufactured home are less likely to allow a home inspection. Regarding 
other control factors; such as presence of children and/or senior members (Dependent), 
location of household in an evacuation zone (Evacuation) and gender of the respondent 
(Gender) do not seem to affect the probability of allowing the inspection. Overall these 
results are consistent with findings from probit models reported in Table 10. 
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 Similar to awareness regarding the MSFH program, I also consider that the 
perception of vulnerability to damages caused by hurricane related hazards 
(Vulnerability) might also be distributed in a non-random fashion across the sample 
(which can potentially cause selectivity bias). In Table 14, I report estimated probability 
of allowing free inspection by using bivariate probit models, allowing Vulnerability to be 
explained by a host of factors in a separate equation. A number of factors explain 
Vulnerability. The coefficients of Damage, Exposure and Evacuation are positive and 
highly significant at 1% levels in Models 9 to 12 implying that physical damages caused 
by hurricane related hazards, prior experience with a tropical storm and/or a hurricane 
and living in an evacuation zone significantly increase the perception of vulnerability. 
The coefficient of Plan is negative and significant (Model 10) implying that households 
with a plan feel less vulnerable. The coefficient of Information is negative and significant 
(at 1% level in Models 11 and 12). Therefore households who think that they have all 
necessary information feel less vulnerable and avoid the HRMS inspection. The 
coefficient of Residency is negative and significant (at 5% levels in Models 11 and 12) 
implying that the number of years a household living in Florida (as a permanent resident) 
negatively affects the perception of vulnerability. Male respondents are less likely to 
reporting vulnerable to damages (the coefficient of Gender is negative and significant at 
5% levels in Models 11 and 12). Other common control variables, such as Education and 
Income, do not seem to affect the perception of vulnerability. The coefficient of 
Mobilehome is positive but not significant implying that households living in mobile or 
manufactured homes do not feel more vulnerable. 
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 Results reported in Table 14 also show the factors affecting the probability of 
allowing inspection (Inspection) when the perception of vulnerability (Vulnerability) is to 
be explained by a host of relevant factors. Consistent with results reported in Table 10 
and 12, the coefficients of Insurance, Damage and Exposure are positive and significant 
at (at 1% to 5% levels) in Models 9 to 12. As seen before (in Tables 3 and 5), years of 
residency in Florida (Residency), living in a mobile or manufactured home (Mobilehome) 
and household size (Members) negatively affects the probability of allowing a home 
inspection (see Models 9 to 12). Income tends to be insignificant, and the coefficient of 
Education is negative, and significant only in Model 9. Regarding other control factors 
such as Dependent, Evacuation and Gender do not seem to effect on willingness to allow 
inspection (see Models 12). Overall results reported here from probit and bivariate 
models (Table 10, 12 and 14) are largely consistent. 
Tables 11, 13, and 15 report the marginal effects of the corresponding coefficients 
reported in Tables 10, 12 and 14. For bivariate probit models, marginal effects refers to 
the impact of a corresponding variable to the probability of allowing inspection 
conditional on the situation that a household is aware or not (in Models 5-8), and 
conditional on the situation that a household feel vulnerable or not to hurricane related 
damages (in Models 9-12). Considering statistically significant components in Tables 4, 
6, and 8, Insurance increases the probability of allowing inspection by 5-21% based on 
different model specifications. Among other major drivers, Damage (by 4-23%)19, 
Exposure (7-34%) and Vulnerability (2-9%) also significantly increase probability of 
                                                        
19 Though, if the respondent seems not to feel vulnerable or while Vulnerability=0, 
increase in damages (Damage) reduces probability of allowing inspection by 5-8% at 1% 
significant level (from Table 15). 
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allowing inspection. Residency (by 1-5%) and Mobilehome (by 1-19%), reduces the 
probability of allowing inspection. Household-specific factors like Members, Income 
(though not so robust), Education and Gender tend to reduce the probability of allowing 
inspection. The role of Information is not consistent as the sign of its marginal effects 
changes across specifications. A similar case is evident for Aware (not significant) 
implying that roles of these factors are not robust across different models. 
7. CONCLUSION 
 Despite the fact, that allocating public funds to promote ex-ante natural hazard 
mitigation measures is not a very popular political agenda (Prater and Lindell 2000), the 
State of Florida has initiated My Safe Florida Home to encourage mitigation. To promote 
preparedness and mitigation, the MSFH program is designed to provide free risk 
information (HRMS) and subsequent grant assistance for eligible households living in 
hurricane prone areas in Florida. Since there is a wide range of heterogeneity exists in 
terms of households’ risk perception, ability to respond and other salient factors (Wilson 
2002), detailed analysis of household behavior in response to a program promoting 
mitigation can provide useful inputs. Risk information is critical to adopting mitigation 
measures; and underlying costs and benefits (implicit and explicit) to seeking information 
influences a household’s choice for risk information. Consistent with this line of 
argument, this study identifies major drivers of household preference for allowing a free 
inspection to receive pertinent risk mitigation information (HRMS), which is tied up with 
further possible benefits (grant assistance, insurance rebates). Based on a variety of 
empirical specifications, the analysis reveals that a household having insurance to protect 
damages to the residential structure is more likely to allow inspection for obtaining 
  94
HRMS. Households who feel vulnerable to physical damages are more likely to allow an 
inspection to obtain HRMS. Households who had physical damages to their home or 
experienced a tropical storm/hurricane are more likely to demand the risk information 
(HRMS). A household, whether aware or not of the MSFH program, does not seem to 
affect the demand for risk mitigation information. Households who had damages and 
experience with storms, who live in an evacuation zone are seen to feel venerable. 
Households who, are also living in Florida longer, are certain that they have necessary 
information and have a plan to act on, feel less vulnerable. Households who have 
insurance, information and a plan to act on are more likely to be aware of the MSFH 
program. There is limited evidence that households with low income and less education 
tend to have a higher demand for risk information. Thus, more aggressive targeting to 
reach low income and less educated households will increase the programs’ effectiveness. 
Households with more members living in the home are less likely to demand risk 
information. Households who live in a manufactured or mobile home are less likely to 
allow inspection though they are more likely to be aware of the MSFH program. These 
groups of households that face a disproportionately higher level of risk should be a focus 
of priority in the future. 
 Accessible risk information is often missing in the context of natural hazards 
mitigation planning. An essential component of the MSFH program is to provide 
homeowners with risk information to facilitate risk mitigation activities. A wide range of 
literature, documents that mitigation measures adopted by households are sensitive to 
useful risk information available. Information sensitive proactive mitigation measures are 
very efficient from the viewpoint of economic returns (Multihazard Mitigation Council 
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2005). The indirect benefits not only include reduced public expenditures in post-disaster 
recovery process, but it helps to stabilize insurance premiums at relatively low levels, as 
it is likely to reduce the extent of catastrophic losses. 
 Looking back, in 1968 the federal government instituted the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) task force, which suggested that the application of the NFIP 
could improve the economic efficiency of flood plain households, and that “property 
owners must have sufficient information about flood risk... to make well-informed home 
purchase decisions” (Krutilla 1966). The same argument holds for promoting hurricane 
preparedness culture through mitigation measures since the information regarding HRMS 
can be used in setting property values, which is reflective of mitigation measure 
undertaken to withstand the rising threat of coastal hazards. 
 The results also point resilience, adaption, or salience nature of human nature. 
Duration of residency in Florida (Residency) reduces feeling of vulnerability, and also 
inspection willingness of households. Florida is known for its wild hurricane season 
(Jewell 2002); and longer a household resides in Florida, it can possibly signal experience 
of the household with hurricanes. Therefore, with repeated encounters with hurricanes 
and with developed resilience to hurricane damages, households are not willing to seek 
risk information. If a household does not feel vulnerable, even after encountering 
hurricanes or after experiencing hurricane damages in the past, it is less probable that the 
household seek risk information or a MSFH inspection visit (see Table 15). It is therefore 
important to incorporate policy prescription that targets resilience to hurricane damages, 
and result efficient mitigation investment through risk information. 
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In closing, I find robust evidence that a household is more likely to allow 
inspection to seek risk information, if the household has a insurance, feels vulnerable, had 
storm related damages in the past, or exposed to storms before. The findings indicate the 
MSFH program’s unique ability to link incentives offered by private (insurance 
companies) and public agencies (State) in promoting mitigation for vulnerable groups of 
households. However, consideration should be given to set priorities, and target 
households who face a disproportionately higher risk but still less likely to respond (e.g. 
large households and mobile home residents). While combining different set of incentives 
can be very effective to establish private–public partnership (Gutmann 2006) in co-
producing the optimal level of mitigation for the society, attention should be given to 
ensure that one set of incentives complements the other, rather than undermining each 
other. 
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TABLES 
Table 8: General findings from survey responses 
Survey Question N % Survey Question N % 
A. How vulnerable do you feel to damages from a hurricane or 
related tornado or flooding hazards? 
E. Are you aware of any discounts offered by your insurance company 
for homes that have hurricane safety features? 
Extremely Vulnerable  99   12.38 %  Yes 403 50.38 %     
Somewhat Vulnerable  336 42.00 % No 347 43.38 %     
Not Too Vulnerable  338 42.25 %  Do Not Know 47 5.88 %       
Not Sure 27 3.37 % No Response 3 0.38 %      
Total  800 100.00% Total 800 100.00 % 
B. Have you or any adults in your household been living in a home 
physically damaged by a hurricane?
F. Would you allow a State inspector into your home to evaluate 
hurricane mitigation measures for free?  
Yes 317 39.62 % Yes 535 66.88 % 
No 483      60.38 % No  265 33.12 % 
Total 800  100.00 % Total 800 100.00 % 
C. How badly was it damaged?   
G. Are you aware of the Sate program called My Safe Florida Home 
that provides free home inspections and monetary (grant) assistance 
for residents to strengthen their homes? 
Major 59       18.61 % Yes 235 29.38 % 
Moderate   120      37.85 %  No 565 70.62 % 
Slight 138 43.53 %  Total 800 100.00 % 
Total 317 100.00 % H. Do you have a plan for what you would do if a serious hurricane threatens your home? 
D. What were the primary causes of damages to your home Yes 692 85.3% 
Wind Debris Breaking Windows 56       17.83 %  No  118 14.8% 
Wind Damaging to the Roof 195      62.1 %  Total 800 100.0% 
Flooding Related to Hurricane Inundation 17        5.41 % I. How certain are you that you have all the information to protect yourselves and your home from hurricane damages?  
Trees Falling on House 31        9.87 % Not sure  16 2 % 
Something Else 13        4.14 % Not certain at all  63 7.88 % 
Do Not Know 2        0.64 % Somewhat certain 253 31.63 % 
Total 314    100.00 % Very certain 468 58.50 % 
   Total 800 100 % 
 Notes: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding of decimals.
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Table 9: Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description N Mean St. Dev 
HRMS Would you allow State inspector into your 
home to evaluate hurricane mitigation measures 
for free? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.70 0.46 
Vulnerability How vulnerable do you feel to damages from 
hurricane or related tornado or flooding 
hazards? (1= extremely or somewhat 
vulnerable, 0= not too vulnerable) 
596 0.56 0.50 
Insurance  Do you currently have homeowner’s or renter’s 
insurance? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.88 0.33 
Damage Have you living in a home physically damaged 
by a hurricane? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.40 0.49 
Exposure Have you experienced any tropical storm or a 
hurricane? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.96 0.18 
Members How many people live in your household? 596 3.19 5.78 
Education What is the highest grade of school completed 
by an adult member of your household? (1= 
elementary grade school, 2= some high school, 
3= high school graduate, 4= some college, 5= 
college graduate, 6= graduate degree) 
596 4.55 1.17 
Residency How many years you have been a permanent 
resident of Florida? (1= <=2 yrs, 2= 3-10 yrs, 
3= 11-20 yrs, 4= 21-50 yrs, 5= more than 50 
yrs) 
596 3.38 1.06 
Mobilehome Type of home (1= manufactured or mobile 
home, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.062 0.24 
Income What is your annual household income? 
(1= under $20,000, 2= $20,000-30,000, 
3=$30,000-50,000, 4= 50,000-75,000, 
5=75,000-1,00,000, 6= more than 1,00,000) 
596 3.66 1.64 
Aware Are you aware of the Sate program called My 
Safe Florida Home? (1 if Yes, 0 = otherwise) 
596 0.31 0.46 
Plan Do you have a plan if a serious hurricane 
threatens your home? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.85 0.36 
Information How certain that you have all the information to 
protect yourselves and your home from 
hurricane damages? (1= not certain at all, 2= 
somewhat certain, 3= very certain) 
596 2.52 0.64 
Dependent Are you living with children under 12 years 
and/ or seniors above 65 years? (1= Yes, 0= 
otherwise) 
596 0.55 0.50 
Evacuation Is your home located in a hurricane evacuation 
zone? (1= Yes, 0= otherwise) 
596 0.30 0.46 
Gender Gender (1= if respondent is male, 0= female) 596 0.39 0.49 
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Table 10: Estimated probability (Probit estimation) of allowing HRMS inspection 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Vulnerability 0.25 (0.11)** 0.25 (0.11)** 0.24 (0.12)** 0.23 (0.12)** 
Insurance 0.51 (0.17)*** 0.54 (0.18)*** 0.56 (0.18)*** 0.53 (0.17)*** 
Damage 0.43 (0.12)*** 0.43 (0.12)*** 0.44 (0.12)*** 0.43 (0.12)*** 
Exposure 0.63 (0.31)** 0.63 (0.31)** 0.64 (0.31)** 0.63 (0.30)** 
Members -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)* -0.02 (0.01)** -0.03 (0.01)** 
Education -0.10 (0.05)* -0.08 (0.05) -0.08 (0.05) -0.09 (0.05)* 
Residency -0.12 (0.05)** -0.12 (0.06)** -0.12 (0.06)** -0.11 (0.06)** 
Mobilehome -0.48 (0.23)** -0.50 (0.23)** -0.50 (0.23)** -0.49 (0.23)** 
Income  -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04)  
Aware  -0.01 (0.12) -0.01 (0.12) -0.02 (0.12) 
Plan  0.02 (0.17) 0.04 (0.17) 0.01 (0.17) 
Information   -0.06 (0.09) -0.06 (0.09) 
Dependent   -0.08 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) 
Evacuation    0.09 (0.13) 
Gender    0.06 ((0.12) 
Constant 0.14 (0.43) 0.12 (0.43) 0.26 (0.46) 0.23 (0.46) 
N 596 596 596 596 
Pseudo LL -337.84 -337.60 -337.19 -337.01 
Wald (χ2) 49.14*** 50.78*** 53.23*** 52.44*** 
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in 
the parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
  103
Table 11: Marginal effects of Probit estimation reported in Table 10 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Vulnerability 0.09 (0.04)** 0.09 (0.04)** 0.08 (0.04)** 0.08 (0.04)** 
Insurance 0.19 (0.06)*** 0.20 (0.07)*** 0.21 (0.07)*** 0.20 (0.07)*** 
Damage 0.14 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.04) *** 0.14 (0.04)*** 
Exposure 0.24 (0.12)** 0.24 (0.12)** 0.24 (0.12) ** 0.24 (0.12)** 
Members -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.005)* -0.01 (0.004)** -0.01 (-0.005)* 
Education -0.03 (0.02)* -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)* 
Residency -0.04 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)** 
Mobilehome -0.18 (0.09)** -0.19 (0.09)** -0.19 (0.09)** -0.18 (0.09)** 
Income  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)  
Aware  -0.003 (0.04) -0.002 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) 
Plan  0.005 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) 0.002 (0.06) 
Information   -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
Dependent   -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 
Evacuation    0.03 (0.04) 
Gender    0.02 (0.04) 
N 596 596 596 596 
Pseudo LL -337.84 -337.60 -337.19 0337.01 
Wald (χ2) 49.14*** 50.78*** 53.23*** 52.44*** 
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in 
the parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
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Table 12: Bivariate Probit estimation of HRMS inspection (Inspection) and MSFH program awareness (Aware) 
Variable ( X ) Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Inspection Aware Inspection Aware Inspection Aware Inspection Aware 
Vulnerability 0.25  (0.11)**  
0.25  
(0.11)**  
0.24  
(0.12)**  
0.23  
(0.12)**  
Insurance 0.51  (0.17)*** 
0.45  
(0.19)** 
0.54  
(0.18)*** 
0.48  
(0.19)*** 
0.56  
(0.17)*** 
0.43  
(0.19)** 
0.53  
(0.17)*** 
0.34  
(0.19)* 
Damage 0.43  (0.12)*** 
0.12  
(0.11) 
0.43  
(0.12)***  
0.44  
(0.12)***  
0.43  
(0.12)*** 
0.09  
(0.11) 
Exposure 0.63  (0.31)**  
0.63  
(0.31)** 
0.05  
(0.3) 
0.64  
(0.31)**  
0.63  
(0.3)**  
Members -0.03  (0.02)  
-0.03  
(0.02)* 
-0.07  
(0.04) 
-0.02  
(0.01)** 
-0.07  
(0.04)* 
0.03  
(0.01)*  
Education -0.1  (0.05)*  
-0.08  
(0.05) 
0.06  
(0.05) 
-0.08  
(0.05) 
0.04  
(0.05) 
-0.09  
(0.05)*  
Residency -0.12  (0.05)**  
-0.12  
(0.06)**  
-0.12  
(0.06)**  
-0.11  
(0.06)** 
0.04  
(0.05) 
Mobilehome -0.48  (0.23)**  
-0.5  
(0.23)**  
-0.5  
(0.23)**  
-0.49  
(0.23)** 
0.4  
(0.23)* 
Income   -0.03  (0.04)  
-0.03  
(0.04)   
0.1  
(0.04)*** 
Plan   0.02  (0.17)  
0.04  
(0.17)  
0.01  
(0.17)  
Information  0.19  (0.09)**   
-0.06  
(0.09) 
0.19  
(0.09)** 
-0.06  
(0.09) 
0.15  
(0.09)* 
Dependent     -0.08  (0.11)  
-0.07  
(0.11)  
Evacuation    0.09  (0.12)  
0.08  
(0.12) 
0.09  
(0.13) 
0.05  
(0.12) 
  105
Gender       0.06  (0.12) 
0.08  
(0.11) 
Constant 0.14  (0.43) 
-1.44 
(0.27)*** 
0.12  
(0.43) 
-1.06 
(0.41)*** 
0.26  
(0.46) 
-1.38 
(0.33)*** 
0.24  
(0.46) 
-1.83 
(0.33)*** 
N 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 
ρ  -0.01  
(0.07)  
-0.01  
(0.07)  
-0.005  
(0.07)  
-0.01  
(0.07)  
Log pseudo -
likelihood -699.43  -699.14  -696.6  -693.18  
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors.
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Table 13: Marginal effects of estimated coefficients reported in Table 12 
Variable ( X ) Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  
Vulnerability 0.03  (0.01)** 
0.06  
(0.03)** 
0.03 
(0.01)** 
0.06 
(0.03)** 
0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.06 
(0.03)** 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.05 
(0.03)** 
Insurance 0.14 (0.04)*** 
0.05  
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.03)*** 
0.06  
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.03)*** 
0.07  
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.03)*** 
0.07  
(0.06) 
Damage 0.07 (0.03)** 
0.07 
(0.04)* 
0.04 
(0.01)*** 
0.1 
(0.03)*** 
0.04 
(0.01)*** 
0.1 
(0.03)*** 
0.07 
(0.03)** 
0.08 
(0.04)* 
Exposure 0.07 (0.04)* 
0.16 
(0.08)* 
0.08 
(0.05)* 
0.16  
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.04)** 
0.17 
(0.08)** 
0.07 
(0.04)** 
0.17 
(0.08)** 
Members -0.003 (0.002) 
-0.01 
(0.005) 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.002)* 
-0.01 
(0.004)* 
Education -0.01 (0.005)* 
-0.02 
(0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02)* 
0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02)* 
-0.01 
(0.005)* 
-0.02 
(0.01)* 
Residency -0.01 (0.005)** 
-0.03 
(0.01)** 
-0.01 
(0.006)** 
-0.03 
(0.01)** 
-0.01 
(0.006)** 
-0.03 
(0.01)** 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.02)** 
Mobilehome -0.05 (0.03)** 
0.12 
(0.06)* 
-0.06 
(0.03)** 
-0.13 
(0.06)** 
-0.05 
(0.03)** 
-0.13 
(0.06)** 
0.02  
(0.07) 
-0.21 
(0.06)*** 
Income   -0.003 (0.004) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01)*** 
-0.02 
(0.01)*** 
Plan   0.002 (0.02) 
0.004 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
0.01  
(0.04) 
0.0007 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
Information 0.05 (0.02)** 
-0.05 
(0.02)**   
0.04  
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.03)* 
0.03  
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.03)* 
Dependent     -0.01 (0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
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Evacuation   0.02  (0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
0.01  
(0.04) 
Gender       0.03  (0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
N 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors. 
( )1ln,111 === erabilityVuHRMSPY  and ( )0ln,110 === erabilityVuHRMSPY
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Table 14: Bivariate Probit estimation of allowing HRMS inspection (Inspection) and vulnerability (Vulnerability) 
Variable ( X ) Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Inspection Vulnerability Inspection Vulnerability Inspection Vulnerability Inspection Vulnerability
Insurance 0.50 (0.17)***  
0.53 
(0.18)***  
0.56 
(0.18)***  
0.53 
(0.17)***  
Damage 0.47 (0.11)*** 
0.46 
(0.11)*** 
0.48 
(0.12)*** 
0.48 
(0.11)*** 
0.49 
(0.12)*** 
0.55 
(0.11)*** 
0.48 
(0.12)*** 
0.54 
(0.11)*** 
Exposure 0.7 (0.3)** 
0.94 
(0.33)*** 
0.72 
(0.3)** 
0.98 
(0.34)*** 
0.72 
(0.3)** 
1.14 
(0.35)*** 
0.72 
(0.3)** 
1.14 
(0.35)*** 
Members -0.03 (0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.01)**  
-0.03 
(0.01)*  
Education -0.1 (0.05)*  
-0.08 
(0.05)  
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05)  
Residency -0.12 (0.05)**  
-0.12 
(0.05)**  
-0.13 
(0.05)** 
-0.1 
(0.05)** 
-0.12 
(0.05)** 
-0.1 
(0.05)* 
Mobilehome -0.47 (0.23)**  
-0.49 
(0.23)**  
-0.49 
(0.23)**  
-0.48 
(0.23)** 0.11 (0.24) 
Income   -0.03 (0.04)  
-0.03 
(0.04)   0.02 (0.03) 
Aware   -0.01 (0.12)  
-0.01 
(0.12)  
-0.02 
(0.12)  
Plan   -0.01 (0.17) 
-0.34 
(0.15)** 
0.04  
(0.17)  
0.01  
(0.17)  
Information     -0.08 (0.09) 
-0.29 
(0.09)*** 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.31 
(0.09)*** 
Dependent    -0.16 (0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.11)  
-0.07 
(0.11)  
Evacuation  0.38 (0.12)***  
0.4 
(0.12)***  
0.41 
(0.12)*** 
0.12  
(0.13) 
0.41 
(0.12)*** 
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Gender      -0.24 (0.11)** 
0.04  
(0.11) 
-0.25 
(0.11)** 
Constant 0.19  (0.42) 
-1.05 
(0.32)*** 
0.19  
(0.42) 
-0.72 
(0.35)** 
0.4  
(0.45) 
0.23  
(0.46) 
0.34  
(0.45) 
-0.15 
(0.41) 
N   596  596  596  
ρ  0.14  
(0.07)  
0.14  
(0.07)  
0.14  
(0.07)  
0.14 
(0.07)*  
Log pseudo 
likelihood -725.3  -721.61  -711.24  -712.74  
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 15: Marginal effects of estimated coefficients reported in Table 14 
Variable ( X ) Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  dx
dY11  dx
dY10  
Insurance 0.1 (0.04)*** 
0.08 
(0.03)*** 
0.1 
(0.04)*** 
0.09 
(0.03)*** 
0.11 
(0.03)*** 
0.09 
(0.03)*** 
0.11 
(0.04)*** 
0.09 
(0.03)*** 
Damage 0.21 (0.04)*** 
-0.05 
(0.03)* 
0.22 
(0.04)*** 
-0.06 
(0.03)* 
0.24 
(0.04)*** 
-0.08 
(0.03)** 
0.23 
(0.04)*** 
-0.07 
(0.03)** 
Exposure 0.31 (0.06)*** 
-0.04  
(0.1) 
0.32 
(0.06)*** 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
0.34 
(0.05)*** 
-0.06  
(0.1) 
0.34 
(0.05)*** 
-0.07  
(0.1) 
Members -0.005 (0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002)** 
0.004 
(0.002)** 
-0.005 
(0.003)* 
-0.004 
(0.002)* 
Education -0.02 (0.01)* 
-0.01 
(0.003)* 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01)* 
-0.01 
(0.01)* 
Residency -0.02 (0.01)** 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.05 
(0.02)*** 
0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.02)*** 
0.01  
(0.02) 
Mobilehome -0.09 (0.05)* 
-0.08 
(0.04)** 
-0.1 
(0.05)* 
-0.08 
(0.04)** 
-0.1 
(0.05)* 
-0.08 
(0.04)** 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.1 
(0.06)* 
Income   -0.005 (0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Aware   -0.001 (0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
Plan   -0.09 (0.05)* 
0.09  
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.006 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
Information     -0.1 (0.02)*** 
0.07 
(0.03)** 
-0.1 
(0.03)*** 
0.07 
(0.03)*** 
Dependent   -0.04 (0.03) 
0.04  
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
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Evacuation 0.1 (0.03)*** 
-0.1 
(0.03)*** 
0.11 
(0.03)*** 
-0.11 
(0.03)*** 
0.11 
(0.03)*** 
-0.11 
(0.03)*** 
0.13 
(0.04)*** 
-0.09 
(0.03)*** 
Gender     -0.07 (0.03)** 
-0.07 
(0.03)** 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.03)** 
N 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 
Notes: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis are robust standard 
errors. 
( )1ln,111 === erabilityVuHRMSPY  and ( )0ln,110 === erabilityVuHRMSPY
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CHAPTER IV: 
HURRICANE WILMA, UTILITY DISRUPTION AND HOUSEHOLD WELLBEING 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
On 15th October 2005 a tropical depression formed in the Caribbean Sea near 
Jamaica. Soon it started to intensify and formed a tropical storm. The storm continued 
intensifying and became a hurricane on October 18. Afterwards it was named Hurricane 
Wilma. In next 24 hours, Hurricane Wilma turned into a category 5 hurricane with winds 
of 185 mph (295 km/h). It made several landfalls and the most destructive effects were 
felt in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico, Cuba, and the U.S. state of Florida. At least 63 
deaths were reported, and damages were estimated at over $28.9 billion ($20.6 billion in 
the US; 2005 US dollars). Due to its severe destruction, Hurricane Wilma is among the 
top five costliest hurricanes ever recorded in the Atlantic (Pasch et al. 2006). The storm 
whacked the backbone of the Florida Power and Light’s (FPL) electrical grid. Almost 3.2 
million of FPL’s 4.3 million customers were without power (Johnson 2006). The inflicted 
damage by Wilma on FPL’s electrical grid was mainly severe in most populated counties 
of South Florida, i.e. Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach (Collier et al. 2008).  
Supply of drinking water also became limited. Due to loss of power, water 
stations were unable to operate their pumps properly. Power-loss also reduces water-
pressure in pipelines. The water-pressure in pipelines ensures that supplied water is free 
from harmful bacteria. If the pressure is low, health authorities suggest people to boil 
water before drinking (Nigg 1990). However, due to interruption in power supply and 
limited availability of gasoline, households could neither purify nor boil supplied water.  
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Households’ wellbeing was significantly affected by disruptions of public utility 
services and other associated damages in the aftermath of Hurricane Wilma. Two main 
factors that determine the extent of loss in household wellbeing are mitigation efforts to 
reduce wind-related damages and access to alternative options for public utility services. 
Allocation of additional resources by investing in disaster preparations (e.g. shutters, 
hurricane resistant windows and doors) reduces damages to certain extent, but cannot 
mitigate them completely. Money spent on alternative options for recovery, for example 
by reducing dependence on public utility services (e.g. owning a generator) or by 
purchasing sufficient hurricane supplies can significantly reduce post-hurricane 
sufferings. However, as resources are limited, mitigation and alternative recovery 
measures need to be taken according to their effectiveness. The effectiveness of 
mitigation measures can provide key inputs for disaster planning (Shafran 2008). Sharing 
knowledge and experiences with catastrophic incidents also help people to learn the 
benefit of disaster preparation (Jaeger et al. 2007). Proactive policies can communicate 
the benefits of mitigation and expedite disaster recovery for citizens exposed to disasters 
(Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). To extend this line of research, we investigate the 
benefit of disaster preparation in the aftermath of Hurricane Wilma. 
Researchers at the International Hurricane Research Center (IHRC) in Miami, 
Florida, conducted a telephone survey immediately after the landfall of Hurricane Wilma 
(November 13-20, 2005).  Selected randomly from a list of registered voters of South 
Florida, respondents were asked to document their pre-hurricane preparation and post-
hurricane experience of damages and loss in utility due to Hurricane Wilma. We have 
applied a random utility model to analyze their responses. Our findings indicate the 
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importance of electricity and water supply and alternative access to public utility services 
(e.g. generator). We find investment made on hurricane mitigation significantly improve 
the economically efficient, and recommend allocation of additional resources in hurricane 
preparation and recovery services.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Low-intensity hurricanes cause less structural damages than high-intensity 
hurricanes, but still can have severe impact on regional economic activities (Burrus et al. 
2002). Local businesses lose substantial amount of economic activities due to hurricanes 
(Wyman 2006, Toba 2009). Besides financial damages, loss in mental and physical 
health of survivors raises serious concerns (Chan et al. 2008, Kessler et al. 2008). 
Hurricane-related post-traumatic stress leads to reduce life expectancy of survivors 
(Smith 2008). Human sufferings are likely to increase as the average annual hurricane 
damages are expected to rise in the future (Nordhaus 2006, Banuri 2005). In order to 
avoid serious consequences, it is important to explore the pathways of how to reduce 
hurricane related damages and suffering (Hentenryck et al. 2010). 
 Post-hurricane sufferings are subject to vulnerability, adaptation, or resilience of 
households. Vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience analyze human dimensions of global 
environmental change. From Blaikie et al. (1994), vulnerability is a combination of 
factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood are at risk by a 
discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society. Adaptation is generally perceived to 
include an adjustment in social and ecological systems (Janssen and Ostrom 2006). 
Resilience determines the ability of one system to absorb changes, damages and 
discomforts (Holling 1973, Page. 17). An active adaptation to disasters is either intended 
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to reduce losses or alleviate sufferings (Lindell and Whitney 2000). Severe loss in 
welfare can be also avoided through building inventories that increase resilience to 
hurricane suffering (Rose 2004). Therefore, scholarly researches are always proposed that 
explain what kind of mitigation and inventory investment reduces household suffering 
from catastrophe events (Kunreuther et al. 2004). 
People often fail to recognize or act against low-probability but high-consequence 
events such as hurricanes (Shaw and Woodward 2008). Risk information increases 
efficiency in managing resources to act against such low-probability and high-
consequence events (Costello et al. 1998; Bontems and Thomas 2000). Disaster 
preparation depends on households’ characteristics as well (Peacock et al. 2005). For 
instance, Peacock (2003) has explained choice of hurricane mitigation measures with 
year of residency, income and ethnicity. In addition to mitigation measures, evacuation 
and moving to a shelter are two other important decisions associated with catastrophe 
events. Evacuation choice of households depends on their risk perception, disaster 
preparedness, social influence and economic resources (Riad and Norris 1998). 
Transportation issues or traffic problems associated with evacuation during hurricanes is 
one of the major factor of concerns (Dow and Cutter 2002). Improved decision support 
system during hurricane emergencies can therefore facilitate evacuation (Lindell et al. 
2005; West and Lenze 1994). 
Nevertheless, the literature is limited in evidence that explains how loss in welfare 
due to hurricane damages reduces, from empirical examples (Ewing et al. 2007). 
Restoration of utility services, disrupted during catastrophic incidents, is as important as 
mitigation investments (Carlsson and Martinsson 2008) and efficient allocation of 
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existing resources is possible by investigating households’ preference for alternative 
recovery of utility services and examples of mitigation benefit (Rose 2007). Such 
findings will guide to better disaster preparations that reduce loss in household wellbeing 
due to catastrophe damages (Tierney et al 2001).  
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK   
Let us suppose that the utility of an individual depends on his consumption of a 
composite good (G) and essential public utility services (S). That is, 
U = U(G, S, X)     (1) 
In the above equation, X is the socio-demographic characteristic vector of the respondent. 
If P represents the price of G and Y is family income, the money-metric representation of 
utility is, 
V = V (P, Y, S, X)      (2) 
Now, suppose that a catastrophic event causes interruption in utility services from S0 to S1 
(S0 > S1) and CVS is the corresponding Hicksian compensating variation. Such an 
interruption results loss in utility. However, by the definition of the Hicksian 
compensating variation 
V (P, Y, S0, X) = V (P, Y + CVS, SH, X)    (3) 
CVS is increasing in ΔS (= S0 - S1) and zero as S0 = S1. 
Now, suppose that a hurricane causes monetary damage of DH and limited supply 
of utility services, SH (S0 > SH). Then, the money metric utility level of the representative 
respondent is 
VH = V (P, Y - DH, SH, X)    (4) 
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Therefore, the loss in household’s wellbeing (ΔV) due to a hurricane is,  
ΔV = V (P, Y, S0, X) - V (P, Y - DH, SH, X)    (5) 
In accordance with above discussion, we can empirically test the following three 
hypotheses.    
Hypothesis 1: ΔV/ΔDH = + (higher damage leads to increase the loss of household 
wellbeing) 
Hypothesis 2: ΔV/ΔS = + (longer disruption of utility services leads to increase 
the loss of household wellbeing) 
Hypothesis 3: ΔV/ΔX= +/- (socio-demographic characteristics of a respondent 
may either moderate or intensify the loss of household wellbeing) 
4. ESTIMATION 
Soon after the landfall of Hurricane Wilma (October 24, 2005), researchers at the 
International Hurricane Research Center (Miami, Florida) conducted a telephone survey 
(November 13-20, 2005). Respondents were randomly selected from a list of registered 
voters from three counties of South Florida, i.e., Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach. 
Out of 612 households surveyed, 39% were from Miami-Dade, 33.7% were from 
Broward and 27.3% were from West-Palm Beach. However, the total number of usable 
responses in regression analyses has been reduced to 360 due to missing information. In 
table 16, we have reported the definitions and descriptive statistics of variables used in 
the analyses.  
Of the usable responses, 40.56% of the respondents are male, 57.22% are White, 
18.06% are African-American and 20.28% are Hispanic. Only 10%respondents reported 
that they evacuated their house due to Hurricane Wilma and only 1.39% went to a 
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hurricane shelter. More than fifty percent (50.42%) of the respondents said that they 
received free supply of ice, water and food. Approximately 28.33% respondents had 
access to an electric generator, and 65.56%respondentsused hurricane shutter to protect 
their homes from strong wind and rain.  
Respondents were asked to rank the impact of Hurricane Wilma on their life 
(Impact) in four classes: ‘Devastating’ (Impact = 1), ‘Serious’ (Impact = 2), ‘Somewhat 
serious’ (Impact = 3) and ‘Not at all serious’ (Impact = 4). Almost 17%, 44%, 29% and 
11% of the respondents felt that the impact of Hurricane Wilma on their life to be 
‘Devastating’, ‘Serious’, ‘Somewhat serious’ and ‘Not at all serious’, respectively. 
Almost 15% of the respondents said that they never lost power, whereas around 16% of 
the respondents were without electricity for more than 2 weeks. Water supply of 56.39% 
of the respondents was never disrupted due to the landfall of Hurricane Wilma. 
Nevertheless, 14 respondents out of the 360 respondents were without the supply of 
drinking water for more than 2 weeks. Most of the respondents, 57.50%, had a week 
stock of hurricane supplies. Nearly 32%, 22%, 11%, 9%, and 27% of the respondents 
estimated their household cost due to Hurricane Wilma less than $500, between $500 and 
$1000, between $1000 and $2000, between $2000 and $3000, and more than $3000. 
Nearly 9% and 6% of the respondents said that they were unable to use their telephone 
and cell phone for more than two weeks.  
 The explanatory variables in our analysis include: monetary cost of hurricane (DH 
; Household Cost, Wages), disruption in utility services (ΔS ; Electricity, Water, Phone, 
Cell Phone) and a vector of  household characteristics (X) e.g., respondent’s gender 
(Gender), ethnic background (White, Black, Hispanic), political orientations (Democrat, 
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Republican), location (Miami Dade, Broward, West Palm), hurricane preparation 
(Shutter, Supplies, Evacuate, Shelter) and disaster relief (Ice-Water-Food).  
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we have applied the ordered 
logit estimation method (Greene 1995, pp. 469–481). The ordered logit regression is 
commonly used in similar social science studies (Monge et al. 2011) and the alternative 
ordered probit specification is only a trivial modification and appears to make no 
difference in practice (Greene 1997, p. 673). The common empirical specification can be 
written as follows.  
ΔV = β0 + β1 DH + β2 ΔS + β3 X + ε     (6)   
The above specification can be elaborated that we will estimate using the ordered logistic 
regression.  
Impact = β0 + β1 Household Cost + β2 Electricity + β3 Water + β4 Generator + β5 
Supplies + β6 Ice-Water-Food + β7 Shutter + β8 Evacuate + β9 Shelter +β10 Phone + 
β11Cell Phone + β12 Wages + β13 Gender + β14 Black + β15 White + β16 Hispanic + β17 
Miami Dade + β18 West Palm + ε    (7) 
We used the Broward County as the reference category for location specific dummy 
variable, and so did not include it in equation (7).  
5. RESULTS AND FINDINGS   
We have empirically estimated five different specifications of Equation (7). We 
have reported the proportional odd ratios of corresponding explanatory variables in Table 
18. An odd ratio is the probability of an event divided by the probability of that event not 
occurring. The result suggests that an increase in Household Cost causes the odds of a 
minor hurricane impact to reduce by 0.721 to 0.741 times. In other words, increase in 
Household Cost increases the probability of a major hurricane (Impact = 1), significant at 
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1% level. Interruption in electricity (Electricity) and water supply (Water) also increase 
the probability of a major hurricane (Impact = 1), at 1% or 5% significance level. As 
duration of interruption in electricity increases (e.g., from Electricity = 1 to Electricity = 
2), the odd of a minor hurricane impact decreases by 0.861 to 0.871 times. Similarly, the 
odd of a minor hurricane impact decreases by 0.846 to 0.857 times as water supply gets 
suspended longer (e.g., from Water = 1 to Water =2). The odd of a minor hurricane 
impact increases by 1.425 to 1.471 times in access to an electric generator (Generator), 
although not significant consistently. Other than the third specification, where Generator 
is significant at 1% level, presence of an electric generator reduces increases the odds of a 
minor hurricane impact only at 15% significance level. It can be seen from Figure 16 that 
a higher proportion of the respondents without generator report a serious impact of 
Hurricane Wilma compared to people with access to an electric generator. As we estimate 
the average expected probability of different values of Impact by the fifth specification, 
the expected probability of Impact = 1or 2 is lower for respondents with access to an 
electric generator compared to those without a generator. No other variable, other than 
Household Cost, Electricity, Water and Generator, determines impact of Hurricane 
Wilma on the respondent’s life significantly.  
Table 19 reports the marginal effects of the corresponding odd ratios reported in 
Table 18. Increase in Household Cost raises the probability of a devastating hurricane 
impact (Impact = 1) by 4.6% to 5.6% at 1% level of significance through Model 1 to 
Model 8. Similarly, the probability of Impact = 1 increases by 1.9% to 2.2% with 
duration of suspension in supply of electricity (Electricity) at 5% significance level. 
Longer suspension of water supply (Water) also increases the probability of devastating 
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impact of hurricane (Impact = 1) by 1.3% to 2%, at 5% or 1% level of significance. On 
the other hand, the probability of a devastating impact (Impact = 1) reduces by 5.6% to 
6.9%, as the household under consideration owns a generator.  
We can therefore substantiate the hypotheses mentioned earlier. As proposed in 
Hypothesis 1, we find evidence that increase in estimated cost of Hurricane Wilma 
(Household Cost) causes major loss in household’s wellbeing. In compliance with 
Hypothesis 2, longer disruption in water (Water) and electricity (Electricity) supply 
increases loss in household’s wellbeing. A loss in household’s wellbeing is also subject to 
the respondents’ characteristic, as proposed in Hypothesis 3. Evidence supports that a 
respondent suffers less as he installs an electric generator during his hurricane 
preparation. However, we do not find any significant impact of respondents’ gender, 
ethnic and political orientation, and choice to evaluate and take a shelter during the 
hurricane, Hurricane Wilma. 
6. CONCLUSION   
In this study we tried to investigate the impact of hurricane Wilma on household 
wellbeing and how a wide range factors moderate or intensify this process. It is unusual 
that the survivors do not realize any significant benefit from hurricane-shutters (Shutter). 
People often do not realize the mitigation benefit, as their expected damages are much 
lower than actual. Advanced hurricane forecasting and evacuation make hurricanes seem 
less vulnerable and reduce the expected cost of living in coastal areas (Sadowski and 
Sutter 2005). We are unable to account expected hurricane damages of the respondents 
due to data limitation. The limitation may result this insignificant benefit of hurricane-
shutters.  Still, it can be seen in Figure 17 and 19 that expected probability of reporting 
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devastating or serious impact of Hurricane Wilma (Impact = 1 or 2) is higher for 
respondents without shutter.  Future research can explore this issue in greater detail. 
 None of the socio-demographic characteristics (Gender, Black, White, Hispanic, 
Democrat, Republican etc.) significantly affects loss in households’ wellbeing due to 
Hurricane Wilma. It represents that post-hurricane suffering of the survivors is somewhat 
independent of these characteristics.  Evacuating the house (Evacuation) and/or moving 
to a shelter (Shelter) are also found to be insignificantly affecting the household 
wellbeing. The hurricane evacuees of South Florida mostly use the long stretch of 
Interstate 95 (I-95), the main highway on the East Coast of the United States. If the 
evacuation process is not well coordinated, they may get stranded on the highway in the 
face of an approaching storm (PBS&J 2002; Dow and Cutter 2002). Inconvenience 
during evacuation or moving to a shelter (especially with pets, children and elderly) may 
not be desirable option, which may explain insignificant effect of Evacuation and Shelter.  
 Loss in households’ wellbeing due to suspension in telecommunication (Phone) is 
also found insignificant. Earlier literature suggests that disruption in telecommunication 
affects the businesses significantly than households (Bigger et al. 2009). Widely used 
modern wireless technology of telecommunication is subject to minimal disruption due to 
hurricanes (Nigg 1990; Acker et al. 2012). 
In places like South Florida, coastal residents consider storms as a part of their 
life (Hallstrom and Smith 2005). Still experience of hurricanes makes them worried 
(Picou and Martin 2006). Our findings suggest that coastal residents can reduce post-
hurricane impacts by having electricity generator as hurricane preparation device. Earlier 
research also suggests that willingness to pay for alternative power sources increases with 
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more interruption in electricity (Carlsson, Martinsson, and Akay 2011). Given that, a 
policy recommendation may be subsidizing generator prices for coastal residents to 
promote more uses.  
The empirical evidence indicates that longer disruption in water supply (Water) 
and electricity (Electricity) significantly increases loss in household wellbeing. 
Interruption in supply of electricity makes it difficult to preserve food and affected people 
are unable to use refrigerator or make ice etc. and the availability of ice, water and food 
becomes actually important. However, free supply of ice, water and food (Ice-Water-
Food) seems to make no significant effects on household wellbeing. When hurricane 
affected people fall short of these basic necessities, they may not wait for free supply of 
these relief items and so occasional supply of these items may not significantly affect 
their wellbeing.  It may also imply that people are more interested in finding options (e.g. 
owning a generator) that enable them to cope with these shocks than becoming dependent 
on limited and occasional supply of hurricane relief products. . Some research suggests 
that failure in full-cost accounting of coastal disasters in United States results in 
suboptimal investment in disaster preparation and recovery (Gaddis et al. 2007). 
Incentivizing specific actions that promotes disaster recovery can mitigate this trend in 
some extent. Our results also suggest that planning for disaster recovery and 
rehabilitation may gain by focusing on an enabling agenda that involves participation of 
community members in a decentralized fashion.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 16: Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition N M SD 
Impact How would you describe the impact of Hurricane Wilma on your life? (1 
= Devastating, 2 = Serious, 3 = Somewhat serious, 4 = Not at all serious) 
360 2.34 0.88 
Household 
Cost 
How much money do you estimate Hurricane Wilma cost your 
household? (1 = Less than $500, 2 = $500-$1000, 3 = $1000-$2000, 4 = 
$2000-$3000, 5 = More than $3000)  
360 2.76 1.61 
Electricity How many days was your household without electricity? (0 = Never lost 
power, 1 = Less than 24 hours, 2 = 3 days or less, 3 = 5 days or less, 4 = 
1 week or less, 5 = 10 days or less, 6 = More than 2 weeks)  
360 3.34 1.93 
Water How many days was your household without drinkable water? (0 = 
Never lost water, 1 = Less than 24 hours, 2 = 3 days or less, 3 = 5 days or 
less, 4 = 1 week or less, 5 = 10 days or less, 6 = 2 weeks or less, 7 = 
More than 2 weeks)  
360 1.30 1.93 
Generator Did you have a generator? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)  360 0.28 0.45 
Shutter Were you able to shutter your home? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)  360 0.66 0.48 
Phone How many days was your household without phone service? (0 = Never 
lost phone, 1 = Less than 24 hours, 2 = 3 days or less, 3 = 5 days or less, 
4 = 1 week or less, 5 = 10 days or less, 6 = 2 weeks or less, 7 = More 
than 2 weeks)  
360 2.74 2.16 
Cell Phone How many days was your household without cellphone service? (0 = 
Less than 24 hours, 1 = 3 days or less, 2 = 5 days or less, 3 = 1 week or 
less, 4 = 10 days or less, 5 = 2 weeks or less, 6 = More than 2 weeks) 
360 3.39 1.59 
Supplies How many days of hurricane supplies did you have in preparation? (0= 
None, 1=Supplies for 1 day, 2= 2 days, 3= 3 days, 4=1 week, 5=More 
than 1 week)  
360 3.50 0.86 
Ice-Water-
Food 
In the aftermath did you receive free ice, water, or food? (1= Yes, 0= No) 360 0.50 0.50 
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Evacuate Did you evacuate your home during storm or its aftermath? (1 = Yes, 0= 
Otherwise)  
360 0.10 0.30 
Shelter During Wilma did you go to a shelter? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)  360 0.01 0.12 
Wages How many days of lost wages you had because of Hurricane Wilma? (0 
= Did not miss work, 1 = 1 day, 2 = 2 days, 3 = 3 days, 4 = 4 days, 5 = 1 
week, 6 = 2 weeks, 7 = Lost job)  
360 4.46 2.66 
Gender 1 if the respondent is Male, 0 otherwise  360 0.41 0.49 
Black 1 if the respondent is Black, 0 otherwise  360 0.18 0.39 
White 1 if the respondent is White, 0 otherwise  360 0.57 0.50 
Hispanic 1 if the respondent is Hispanic, 0 otherwise  360 0.20 0.40 
Miami 
Dade 
1 if from Miami-Dade, 0 otherwise 360 0.39 0.49 
Broward 1 if from Broward, 0 otherwise 360 0.33 0.47 
West Palm 1 if from West Palm, 0 otherwise 360 0.28 0.45 
Note: Due to missing information, total number of usable responses in the regression analysis has been reduced to 360. 
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Table 17: Ordered Logit Estimation Result (Dependent Variable: Impact) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Impact Impact Impact Impact Impact 
Household Cost -0.327*** -0.323*** -0.306*** -0.314*** -0.299*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0669) (0.0677) (0.0676) (0.0681) 
      
Electricity -0.140*** -0.138** -0.145*** -0.141*** -0.150*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0541) (0.0552) (0.0545) (0.0556) 
      
Water -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.154*** -0.166*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0564) (0.0560) (0.0565) 
      
Generator 0.357 0.357 0.386* 0.354 0.367 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.234) (0.232) (0.234) 
      
Shutters 0.393* 0.401* 0.404* 0.393* 0.387* 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223) 
      
Phone -0.0872* -0.0818* -0.0842* -0.0797* -0.0819* 
 (0.0476) (0.0480) (0.0482) (0.0483) (0.0483) 
      
Cell Phone -0.105 -0.0946 -0.104 -0.0990 -0.106 
 (0.0651) (0.0662) (0.0669) (0.0664) (0.0669) 
      
Supplies 0.101 0.0993 0.0694 0.108 0.0789 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
      
Ice-Water-Food -0.231 -0.231 -0.190 -0.237 -0.185 
 
(0.202) (0.202) (0.206) (0.203) (0.206) 
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Evacuate -0.262 -0.284 -0.289 -0.269 -0.285 
 (0.337) (0.338) (0.340) (0.342) (0.343) 
      
Shelter -1.181 -1.228 -1.204 -1.291 -1.245 
 (0.838) (0.847) (0.839) (0.854) (0.837) 
      
Wages  -0.0348 -0.0306 -0.0370 -0.0314 
  (0.0392) (0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0406) 
      
Gender   -0.0302 -0.0178 -0.0395 
   (0.210) (0.208) (0.210) 
      
Black   0.262  0.200 
   (0.543)  (0.551) 
      
White   0.632  0.650 
   (0.507)  (0.508) 
      
Hispanic   0.804  0.691 
   (0.539)  (0.557) 
      
Miami Dade    0.201 0.223 
    (0.242) (0.263) 
      
West Palm    0.0209 0.00406 
    (0.263) (0.268) 
      
LR (χ2) Test 60.68*** 61.47*** 65.75*** 62.31*** 66.59*** 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Note: The constant terms are suppressed; ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the 
parenthesis represent corresponding standard error. 
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Table 18: Proportional Odds Ratio (Dependent Variable: Impact) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Impact Impact Impact Impact Impact 
Household Cost 0.721*** 0.724*** 0.737*** 0.730*** 0.741*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Electricity 0.869*** 0.871** 0.865*** 0.869*** 0.861*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Water 0.846*** 0.847*** 0.857*** 0.847*** 0.857*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Generator 1.429 1.430 1.471* 1.425 1.444 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) 
      
Shutters 1.481* 1.493* 1.497* 1.481* 1.473* 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
      
Phone 0.917* 0.921* 0.919* 0.923* 0.921* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Cell Phone 0.900 0.910 0.901 0.906 0.899 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
      
Supplies 1.106 1.104 1.072 1.114 1.082 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
      
Ice-Water-Food 0.794 0.794 0.827 0.789 0.831 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)  
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Evacuate 0.770 0.752 0.749 0.764 0.752 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
      
Shelter 0.307 0.293 0.300 0.275 0.288 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) 
      
Wages  0.966 0.970 0.964 0.969 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Gender   0.970 0.982 0.961 
   (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
      
Black   1.300  1.222 
   (0.71)  (0.67) 
      
White   1.881  1.916 
   (0.95)  (0.97) 
      
Hispanic   2.235  1.996 
   (1.20)  (1.11) 
      
Miami Dade    1.223 1.249 
    (0.30) (0.33) 
      
West Palm    1.021 1.004 
    (0.27) (0.27) 
      
LR (χ2) Test 60.68*** 61.47*** 65.75*** 62.31*** 66.59*** 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Note: The constant terms are suppressed; ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the 
parenthesis represent corresponding standard error.
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Table 19: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Devastating Impact (Impact =1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Impact Impact Impact Impact Impact 
Household Cost 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Electricity 0.017*** 0.017** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Water 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Generator -0.041 -0.041 -0.044* -0.042 -0.042 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Shutters -0.050* -0.051* -0.051* -0.050* -0.048* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Phone 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Cell Phone 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Supplies -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Ice-Water-Food 0.028 0.028 0.023 0.029 0.022 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
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Evacuate 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.035 0.037 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Shelter 0.206 0.217 0.209 0.231 0.218 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
      
Wages  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Gender   0.004 0.002 0.005 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Black   -0.030  -0.023 
   (0.06)  (0.06) 
      
White   -0.079  -0.081 
   (0.07)  (0.07) 
      
Hispanic   -0.081  -0.071 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
      
Miami Dade    -0.024 -0.026 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
      
West Palm    -0.003 -0.000 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
      
LR (χ2) Test 60.68*** 61.47*** 65.75*** 62.31*** 66.59*** 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Note: ***, **, * imply significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively; numbers in the parenthesis represent corresponding 
standard error. 
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ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS 
Chatterjee, Chiradip and Mozumder, Pallab. 2012. Adoption of Green 
Technology: A Diffusion and Learning Process of the Consumers, June 28th to 
July 2nd 2013, Western Economic Association, 88th Annual Conference, Seattle, 
Washington. 
Chatterjee, Chiradip and Mozumder, Pallab. 2013. Pollution Tax, Health 
Insurance, and Information: Policy Treatment to Reduce Energy 
Consumption, June 28th to July 2nd 2013, Western Economic Association, 88th 
Annual Conference, Seattle, Washington. 
Chatterjee, Chiradip and Mozumder, Pallab. 2012. Adoption of Green 
Technology: A Diffusion and Learning Process of the Consumers, 18th 
November 2012, Southern Economic Association, 82nd Annual Meeting, New 
Orleans, LA. 
Chatterjee, Chiradip 2012. Pollution Tax, Health Insurance, and Information: 
Policy Treatment to Reduce Energy Consumption, 9th November 2012, Seminar 
Series, Florida International University, Miami, FL. 
Chatterjee, Chiradip and Mozumder, Pallab. 2012. Hurricane Wilma, Utility 
Disruption and Household Wellbeing, 10th March 2012, Eastern Economic 
Association, 38th Annual Conference, Boston, MA. 
Chatterjee, Chiradip and Mozumder, Pallab. 2011. Adoption of Green 
Technology: A Diffusion and Learning Process of the Consumers, 15th April 
2011, Florida International University, Miami, FL. 
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
Coordinated all aspects of a laboratory decision-making experiment of energy 
conservation. Designed survey, recruited participants, ran experimental sessions, 
paid respondents and took account of their payments, and analysed their responses. 
(Role: Researcher) 
 
Coordinated all aspects of a field data collection. Developed the research motive, 
designed survey, recruited and surveyed respondents, paid respondents, and took 
account of their payments, and analysed the responses. (Role: Researcher) 
 
Coordinated all aspects of a two-day Graduate Student Association conference at 
Florida International University. Scheduled speakers and organized discussion 
groups. (Role: Event Coordinator) 
 
Coordinated all aspects of multiple meetings among populace of Kharar 
Municipality, India. All meetings were held under the Community Participation 
Program of Draft Development Plan. Send invitation, organized and harmonized 
discussion groups, kept account of all payments made on arrangement. (Role: Urban 
Planner) 
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